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Abstract 
This thesis examines the security problematic of African states and focuses 
more particularly on the SADC region. It links the security problematic with the 
transactionalist approach to (supra)national integration and the concept of a 
security community, introduced into internatIonal relations theory by Karl Deutsch 
and his colleagues. 
In relation to the (in)security of SADC member states, the thesis attempts to 
demonstrate that national integration of these states (i.e. the establishment of an 
amalgamated security community) has at least to accompany if not precede the 
\ 
establishment of a security community at the regional level (i.e. a pluralistic 
security community). 
Since threats to the security of SADC member states are mainly non-
military in nature, the 'realist' concept of security is broadened to include political, 
economic, societal and environmental aspects of security at different levels. 
Furthermore, Deutsch's concept of a security community is redefined in line with 
the 'new security thinking' and adapted to the situation in African states. 
11 
Moreover, this thesis attempts to demonstrate that it is essential for SADC 
member states to become strong and socio-economically cohesive in order to 
improve their competitiveness in relation to developed states, especially in their 
ability to deal with internal and transnational/regional threats to their security, 
which are (in)directly caused and perpetuated by the lack of national integration, 
inefficient state-making and underdevelopment - the sources of their weakness. 
! 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
The history of international relations has always been fraught with tensions 
and wars between different (political) entities trying to survive and achieve their 
objectives in a precarious international environment. Therefore, it is not surprising 
that realist scholars, whose theoretical endeavours established international 
relations as a discipline in social sciences, perceived the international system as 
anarchical and relations between states as characterised by the struggle for power, 
security and survival. 
The problem of the anarchical international system figured prominently in 
international relations in the first half of the twentieth century. The horrors of 
World War I and World War II (including the massive abuse of human rights, and 
the creation and employment of nuclear weapons with millions of victims) induced 
scholars to think about how to bring states and nations closer together in a way 
that would make war or any other form of armed conflict highly unlikely. Their 
idea was to integrate states into larger entities or (political) communities. 
\ 
According to Haas (1973: 105) the study of (regional) integration deal~ with 
how and why states cease to be wl}olly sovereign, and how and why they 
voluntarily merge with their neighbours to lose the attributes of sovereignty while 
acquiring new techniques for resolving conflict between themselves. This is in 
general applicable to all main approaches (federalism, functionalism, neo-
functionalism, transactionalism) within the study of integration. 1 
I Although theories of integration can be roughly grouped into those dealing with economic 
integration (e.g. fonnation of free trade areas, customs unions, monetary unions, and economic 
-unions) and those dealing with political or general integration, only the latter will be the subject 
of this research. This is because they focus on the issue of the establishment of peace and security 
between various units/entities via the fonnation of a community or a new political unit as the 
1 
In practice, the process of integration among independent and sovereign 
states was first attempted in Western Europe, where initially six countries formed 
the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) (1951152), European Atomic 
Energy Community (EURATOM), and European Economic Community (EEC) 
(1957/58). After centuries of building up an amalgamated security communilf 
within their own borders, Western European states were able to establish a 
pluralistic security community among themselves through a process of integration. 
The European integration process seems to confirm the idea held by integration 
theorists that this process is a means of promoting peaceful co-operation and 
reducing conflict among states in various parts of the world. 
Following the example of Western European states and aspiring to repeat 
their success, many regional organisations sprang up all over the world, including 
on the African continent. 3 It was believed that such arrangements would contribute 
to the development of African states by providing bigger markets, reducing 
barriers to trade, pulling together scarce resources, encouraging industrialisation, 
and the like. However, these attempts at integration largely failed for many 
,I 
ultimate objective of the integration process. the economic integration process will be discussed 
only in relation to the establishment of a security community. 
2 For definitions of a security community, amalgamated security community and pluralistic 
security community, see section 2.1.5. 
3 Some African regional organisations established with the goal of achieving a form of 
regional integration in the 1960s and 1970s were: the Arab Maghreb Union - AMU (1964), 
Customs and Economic Union of Central Africa - UDEAC (1964), East African Community -
EAC (1967), Economic Community of West African States - ECOWAS (1975), and the West 
African Economic Community - CEAO (1973), which replaced the Customs Union of Western 
African States - UDEAO (1966). At present, one can find the following regional groupings on 
the African continent with similar goals: the AMU (revived in 1989), EAC (revived in 1999), 
Economic Community of Central African States - CEEAC (establi~hed in 1983), Central African 
- Economic and Monetary Community - CEMAC (1994), Common Market for Eastern and 
Southern Africa - COMESA (1993), ECOWAS, Southern African Development Community -
SADC (1992) and the West African Economic and Monetary Union - UEMOA (1994). 
2 
reasons, one of them being the inability of African states to evolve into strong and 
efficient entities such as had evolved in the West.4 
In addition to being economically viable and politically stable, Western 
states managed to resolve their external security problems. This was made possible 
by these states having a monopoly over the means of violence and the fact that 
their military capacity was turned outwards in defence against external enemies. 
This situation differs considerably from the one in African states, which 
possess juridical statehood5 but do not always demonstrate necessary levels of 
empirical statehood. Their security problematic is basically a reverse image of the 
situation pertaining to Western states: while the external security problematic of 
African states was resolved, at least during the Cold War, by the sovereignty 
regime mostly upheld within the framework of the Organisation of African Unity 
(OAU) , internal insecurities such as regime insecurity, illegal migration, soil 
depletion, HIV/AIDS, to name just a few, figure prominently on their agenda. 
Considering the ongoing internal security problems of African states, 
including the incidence of intra-state wars and the potential spill-over effects of 
these insecurities into neighbouring states, it is difficult to ima~ine that this 
situation is in any way conducive to the processes of regional integration in Africa. 
On account of domestic and transnational insecurities, some of the African 
regional organisations recognised that development objectives have to be 
accompanied by security and peace-building objectives and that peace and security 
are necessary for the realisation of developmental goals. This was realised among 
others by COMESA, ECOWAS, and SADC (Schiavone, 1997; Schraepler, 1996). 
4 During the Cold War, the East-West divide referred to the conflict between capitalist, 
industrial democracies of the First World or West (Western Europe, North America and Japan) 
and the Marxist-Leninist countries of the Second World or East {former Soviet Union, -Eastern 
- Europe, sometimes China). The economically less-developed states of Asia, Mrica, and Latin 
America were referred to as the Third World (Viotti and Kauppi, 1999: 476, 497). 
5 For definition of juridical and empirical statehoOd, see section 3.2. 
3 
More specifically, the recognition that a climate of peace, security and stability is a 
prerequisite for development has been included in the Treaty Establishing the 
Southern African Development Community (1992). Despite these goals, the 
attainment of peace, security and stability within the SADC region (i.e. the 
establishment of a pluralistic security community) remains problematic because 
the states taking part in SADC have not yet resolved their internal security 
problems. This means that they have not managed to form amalgamated security 
communities, and this problem obstructs the integration process and development 
efforts of the region. 
Given this situation, the main problem to be addressed in this thesis is the 
evolution of a pluralistic security community within the SADC region. In this 
regard, the attempt will be made to verify the following hypothesis: Since the main 
threats to peace and security within the SADC region come from intra-state 
conflicts and internal insecurities in general, the objective of establishing a 
pluralistic security community (to bring about a climate of peace, security and 
stability) within the region has to be accompanied, if not preceded by, the 
formation of an amalgamated security community within individual member states 
\ 
through a process of national integration. An assumption will be made th.,t the 
process of integration and establishmeut of an amalgamated security community 
within a state is linked to the two interrelated processes of state-making and 
nation-building, and has to be accompanied by a process of development. 
Methodologically, this thesis is based on a comparative study of relevant 
secondary sources: books, journals, newspapers, internet sources and statistics. In 
order to verify its hypothesis, the thesis will review various approaches to the 
study of integration and its processes in the first chapter. The transactionalist 
approach of Karl Deutsch will be examined in detail in order to define the 
concepts of amalgamated and pluralistic security communities, and to identify the 
4 
background conditions essential for their establishment as well as background 
conditions working against their establishment. The emergence of these 
communities in Western Europe and the problems of the application of the 
European experience in African countries will be examined in the second chapter. 
In the third chapter the security problematic of the SADe region will be analysed, 
plus its impact on the integration process within this region. Furthermore, the 
thesis will try to assess different theoretical possibilities in the formation of 
amalgamated and pluralistic security communities within the SADe region. In this 
case, an assumption will be made that the analysis and application of background 
conditions conducive to disintegration in SADe member states will be sufficient 
to either confirm or refute the hypothesis. 
5 
2. THEORIES OF (REGIONAL) INTEGRATION 
Integration theory is a relatively new way of looking at an old problem: the 
merger of two or more political units to form a larger political entity (Hodges, 
1978: 237). Although most of the major attempts to theorise about supranational 
integration were made after World War II, the search for a form of organisation 
transcending the nation-state is almost as old as the modem state system itself. It 
stemmed from dissatisfaction with the working of that system and with the conflict 
which appeared to be an inherent part of it (Hodges, 1978: 237). 
One solution to the problem of conflict and the absence of world order in 
international relations was deemed to be '!: world government. However, many 
scholars have instead put their hope in regional institutions as a step towards 
establishing world peace. Statesmen have done the same: since World War II they 
have sought to overcome the deficiencies of the nation-state by resorting to 
various regional arrangements and preliminary forms of integration in limited 
supranational institutions (Morgan, 1981: 192). 
In general, integration theorists have seen the merger of stateS into a larger 
political community as a means of promoting peaceful co-operation and reducing 
conflict between them. Various approaches to integration inherited this 
preoccupation with peaceful relations from classical federalism and sundry 
schemes for promoting perpetual and universal peace. The argument that peace 
can only be secured by the merger of existing political units into a single one 
(federation) has been made after every major European conflict since the early 
seventeenth century (Hodges, 1978: 238). 
It is therefore not surprising that after World War I, but mostly after World 
- War II, scholars began to study the possibilities of 'eliminating' war and conflict 
6 
among states by means of integration. The general idea was that the establishment 
of regionally limited "islands of peace" (Nye, 1971: 11) would eventually lead to 
the emergence of world peace. Various approaches to integration can thus be seen 
as a contribution to an optimistic vision of post-World-War relations between 
states, and as a 'response' to a pessimistic view of international relations and world 
politics put forward by realist scholars at the same time. 
2.1. Contending Approaches6 
Approximately three decades ago, Haas (1973: 104) noted that the 
dominant desire of students of regional integration was to explain the tendency 
towards a voluntary or non-coercive creation of larger political units, each of 
which self-consciously abstained from the use of force in the relations between the 
participating units and groups. This is one of the characteristics that approaches to 
the integration process discussed bellow have in common.7 However, they differ in 
many other ways. 
6 In this thesis, only the long-range approaches to integration will be reviewed. Other short or 
middle range approaches, such as liberal inter-governmentalism, multi-level governance and the 
like, will be omitted. 
7 Dougherty and Pfaltzgraff (1971: 284) point out several common features of differing 
approaches to the integration process: 
• they share an interest in the process by which loyalty is shifted from one centre to 
another; 
• they are concerned with communications among units to be integrated; 
• they assert that the integrative behaviour of people is a consequence of the 
expectations of some joined rewards and penalties; 
• they see the integr'!c!ion process as successful when people internalise the process; 
• they emphasise the effect of the integration process in one sector upon the aQility of 
participating units to further the process in other sectors; and 
• some theoreticians use systems theory in developing their models (Deutsch, Etzioni 
and Haas). 
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One of the major points of disagreement concerns the definition of 
integration. The term 'integration' sometimes indicates the process of connecting 
parts into a whole, and sometimes the product of this process. However, the best 
understanding should include both meanings of the term (ACimovic, 1987: 262).8 
On the basis of differences in methodology adopted by scholars, Pentland 
(1973: 21-22) identifies four approaches in relation to two major criteria: 
• the result of the integration process, 
• the variables relevant for the integration process. 
According to the first criterion, he distinguishes the state model from the 
community model, and for the second, the approaches stressing political variables 
as opposed to those emphasising economic, social and technological ones. This 
implies that those focusing on political variables concentrate their analysis at the 
level of states, while the latter concentrate their analysis at the level of an 
integrating system as a whole. 
In this section, four approaches to integration, namely federalism, 
functionalism, neo-functionalism and transactionalism, will be analysed, by 
focusing on their explanations as to how the integration process cap lead to the 
establishment of international peace and security. Special attention will be paid to 
the transactionalist approach of Karl Deutsch since it can provide a relatively good 
basis for analysing the situation in African states. 
2.1.1. The Federalist Approach 
The federalist approach to international integration takes as its dominant 
values peace and security. War is considered to be the inevitable product of a 
8 In this thesis, the term 'integration' will refer only to the result of the process of integration, 
and the process itself will be rderred to as 'integration-process' 
8 
multi-state system and the perennial struggle for power; therefore, federalists 
argue in favour of an integrated state and the fragmentation of power (Pentland, 
1973: 154-155). 
This approach concerns itself with institutions and institution building, 
including the division of powers between federal, national and local authorities, 
checks and balances between organs of government, and the like (Haas, 1973: 
115). Federalists offer a method of uniting separate states into a new supranational 
entity by means of a formal constitution, adopted as a result of a common political 
commitment made by all parties involved. The central federal government is said 
to be capable of satisfying the criteria of efficiency (by creating central bodies to 
carry out certain functions, and to resolve disputes between constituent parts) and 
democracy (by decentralising activities to ensure greater control and autonomy at 
the local level) (Hodges, 1978: 240-241). 
For the federalists, the integration process is a matter of high politics,9 so 
they rely on the ability of national elites to amass, control and employ the levers of 
power. The federation can be created without previous functional integration 
through the propaganda and education of political elites of the area to be 
\ 
federalised (Codding, 1990: 217). Political elites will thus pursue the goa} of a 
supranational federal system when they realise the need for restructuring the 
conflict-prone multi-state system. 10 
9 Matters of high politics include security and political issues as opposed to social, economic 
and cultural issues (low politics). 
10 This classic federalist approach has been elaborated in the sociological approach of Etzioni 
(Dougherty and Pfaltzgraff, 1971: 281-282), who refers to integration as a condition or a state. 
Integration comes about as a r~~ult ofa process of political unification, and in a form ofa political 
community. This political community possesses an effective control over the use of the means of 
- violence and over a centre of decision-making that is able to affect significantly the allocation of 
resources and rewards throughout the community. Some of this control and decision-making may 
be delegated to federal units. -This political community is therefore a state, an administrative-
9 
Federalists have been criticised for idealistically pinning their hopes mainly 
on the political will of governments as a crucial factor for bringing about a 
federation. In addition, they are over-concerned with the legalistic and institutional 
parts of the integration process and disregard other conditions and factors that are 
instrumental for such a process, including community-building (Hodges, 1978: 
241). Consequently, they are not in touch with the reality of international politics 
(Codding, 1990: 227). 
2.1.2. The Functionalist Approach 
As opposed to federalists, the functionalists subscribe to the community 
model of integration. The ultimate goal oJ the integration process is a world 
society whose units are defined by function. This society is based on a complex, 
interwoven network of international organisations implementing the welfare 
functions, which were traditionally a domain of the nation-state, while rendering 
war impossible at the same time (Pentland, 1973: 70, 75). 
The theme which functionalism is mainly concerned with is the 
development of a working peace system (Taylor, 1975: XI). For Mitrany 
I 
(ACimovic, 1987: 266; Taylor, 1975: XIV), who was probably the most influential 
functionalist scholar, nation-states were unable to preserve peace or to improve the 
social and economic wellbeing of their citizens. He claimed that the creation of 
larger (federal) political units, based on territorial regionalism, would recreate and 
perpetuate all the traditional problems of the international system, including the 
economic unit, and a main point of political identification for the large majority of politically 
aware citizens (Pentland, 1973:~48). 
10 
war-prone behaviour of states. Thus, he advocated functionalism as a theory for 
. . 11 posItIve peace. 
Mitrany (1975: 115, 129; Dougherty and Pfaltzgraff, 1971: 280) suggested 
that the growing complexity of governmental systems and the attendant increase in 
technical, non-political tasks facing governments require that states share their 
sovereignty in certain functional areas if the good performance of these tasks 
demands such an arrangement. 12 
Since the central characteristic of global problems (and their solutions) is 
that they are fundamentally technical in nature, they cannot be settled politically. 
Thus, they need to be dealt with by technical experts, working within the 
framework of international organisations, not politicians (Mitrany, 1975: 223). 
International organisations would therefore gradually take over the performance of 
welfare tasks, traditionally performed by national administrations. 
This process is seen by Mitrany (Hodges, 1978: 239; Dougherty and 
Pfaltzgraff, 1971: 281) as a means of eroding popular support for the nation-state 
and remoulding the attitudes of the masses of people, and thus diminishing the 
threat to world peace posed by nationalism. "The functional approach should 
\ 
help", according to Mitrany (1975: 120), "to make the changes of froptiers 
unnecessary by making frontiers meani,ngless, as it would gradually overlay them 
IJ Mitrany (1975: 184) pointed out that the essence of security is not to keep the nations 
peacefully apart but to bring them actively together. 
12 Mitrany's functional method builds on technical self-determination, which means that a 
function would determine the institutions, powers and authority necessary for its performance, 
and these could vary from function to function. Collaboration of states in one technical or non-
political field would contribt;!e to collaboration in other technical fields. Eventually such 
collaboration would encroach upon, or absorb, the political field (Dougherty and Pfaltzgraff, 
_1971: 280). 
11 
with a continuous growth of common activities and interests, and of common 
administrative agencies." 
For the functionalists, the growth of a community is primarily a rational, 
incremental process of learning by association. As their functional needs are met 
by international organisations, people discover the source of their welfare and 
direct their expectations and loyalties to international organisations rather than to 
their states (Pentland, 1973: 86). This gradually leads to the development of a 
socio-psychological community with co-operative goals, which poses no evident 
threat to the existing cultural identities of groups and individuals (Taylor, 1975: 
X). 
Functionalists have been criticised for putting too much stress on the 
functional processes (issues of low politics) and underestimating issues of high 
politics. Although Mitrany (ACimovic, 1987: 266) suggested that political issues 
divide nations while the economic and social problems bring them together, he 
disregarded the fact that issues of high politics and national interests of states 
basically shape the international agenda, and that issues of low politics are often 
elevated to the level of high politics ('trade wars', for example). Furthermore, the 
\ 
functionalist approach is more a prescriptive plan for action than an analy,sis or 
theory and, like the previous approach" does not reflect the reality of international 
politics (Willetts, 1990: 262). 
2.1.3. The Neo-Functionalist Approach 
N eo-functionalists provide a critique and elaboration of the functionalist 
approach, and they aspire to reconcile the functionalist concern with economics 
and welfare with a theory-of political conflict and choice. Furthermore, they try to 
show how the integration process can advance, not through an economically or 
12 
technologically detennined process and fulfilment of functional needs, but through 
the interaction and resolution of political conflicts among various actors (interest 
groups, political parties, governments, international agencies, and the like) 
pursuing their own interests (Pentland, 1973: 100, 110). Thus, as opposed to 
functionalists, neo-functionalists do not perceive the nation-state as a monolithic 
actor; rather, the state is viewed as a complex of interests and issue areas, some of 
which have more integrative implications than others (Pentland, 1973: 122). 
Political integration is defined not as a condition but as a process of change 
which leads to a political community.13 As opposed to functionalists, who see the 
establishment of larger political communities at the regional level as perpetuating 
the problems of the anarchical international system, the neo-functionalists assume 
that a supranational political community islo be regional in scope and similar to 
the national communities which make it up, only larger (Harrison, 1990: 141). 
This new political community represents a political system of a particularly 
primitive kind, which is defined as a pattern of conflict or decision-making in 
which values are allocated authoritatively for participants, operating at the 
international level (Pentland, 1973: 114, 116). 
\ 
N eo-functionalists assume that by collaborating at the internationpl, or 
better, at the regional level, the actors try to further their individual and collective 
interests in the perfonnance of some relatively non-controversial (technical or 
economic) function. These initial attempts to integrate subsequently spill over into 
more controversial (political) spheres of activity, because the actors realise that 
they can fulfil the original goals only by delegating more authority to collective 
13 Haas (Hodges, 1978: 21.?) has defined political integration as a process whereby political 
actors in several distinct national settings are persuaded to shift their loyalties, expectations and 
- political activities toward a new centre whose institutions possess or demand jurisdiction over the 
pre-existing national states. The result of this process is a new political community, superimposed 
on the pre-existing states. 
13 
decision-making (increasing the level of mutual commitment) or acting together in 
other related functional fields (expanding the scope of mutual commitment) or 
both (Hodges, 1978: 246). At the beginning, the process of spill-over was seen as 
deterministic, but later, neo-functionalists emphasised that there was no economic 
determinism in the spill-over process and that economic integration did not 
automatically lead to political integration (ACimovic, 1987: 268).14 
The integration process thus culminates in a merging of the governments 
involved, as more and more decision-making is transferred to supranational 
institutions (Morgan, 1981: 209) in the form of regional organisations. In the neo-
functionalist model of the integration process a political community is said to be 
engineered by these regional organisations. International organisations sustain or 
expand the supranational political system by providing regular information, by 
forcing members to re-examine their interests and priorities, by supporting the 
formation and development of an international bureaucratic and political elite, and 
by providing an arena for conflict resolution (Pentland, 1973: 117-118). They also 
facilitate a process of elite socialisation as the participants in policy-making begin 
to develop new perspectives, loyalties and identifications as a result of their 
\ 
mutual interactions (Harrison, 1990: 144). However, by focusing on elites) neo-
functionalists neglect the issue of gene~al public attitudes and loyalties (Pentland, 
1973: 129). 
Neo-functionalists have mostly based their writings on the analysis of the 
integration process of Western European states, and the practice has discredited 
their conclusions in several ways (although only a few will be pointed out here). 
Firstly, the expected role of supranational institutions as the motor for the 
14 Haas (1964: 48) recognised that spill-over was not an automatic process because it would 
_ only occur if actors, on the basis of their interests-inspired perception, desired to adapt integrative 
lessons learned in one context to a new situation. 
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integration process has been replaced by inter-governmental bargaining (Harrison, 
1990: 145-146). Secondly, the concept of spill-over is problematic since the 
process of spill-over can be obstructed by political "acts of will" (Dougherty and 
Pfaltzgraff, 1971: 301) on account of the diversity of national objectives, the 
differences in national conditions, and the lack of unifying, distinctively European 
issues as opposed to local or global ones (Hodges, 1978: 250). Thirdly, neo-
functionalists disregard the changes and the dynamics of the international 
environment and the effects that these can have on the integration process 
(Dougherty and Pfaltzgraff, 1971: 301). Finally, since neo-functionalism is based 
on the study of pluralistic and functionally highly differentiated societies, it is not 
applicable to developing countries (ACimovic, 1987: 271). 
2.1.4. Digression: Regionalism and New-Regionalism 
Neo-functionalist writings are considered as part of the literature on 
regionalism. Regionalism is a set of issues rather than a single problem area for the 
analysis of world politics, and consequently there is no one model of regionalism 
or one predominant theoretical framework for the analysis of regionklism (Smith, 
! 
1997: 73).15 
The idea behind the practice of regionalism is that a particular geographical 
area, which is best fitted for the performance of different interrelated tasks judged 
crucial for the welfare of individuals, or for the advantage of governments, can be 
delimited (Taylor, 1993: 7). Stubbs and Underhill (Smith, 1997: 70, 72) identify 
three central dimensions of regionalism. The first is geographical and relates to a 
common historical experience and a sense of shared problems among a 
--
geographically distinct group of countries or societies, which constitute a region. 
15 For different categories ofregionalism, see Taylor (1993), Hurrell (1995) or Smith (1997). 
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However, regions are not fixed once and for all and they can be redefined as 
conditions change. 16 
The second dimension of regionalism is functional and refers to close 
linkages of a distinct kind between countries and societies; there is a 'boundary' to 
the region within which interactions or transactions are more intense than those 
with the outside world. 17 The growth of the (often undirected) processes of societal 
and economic interaction and societal integration is described as regionalisation. 
The areas or tasks of interaction covered by the region or regional organisations 
can differ in scope (Hurrell, 1995: 334; Smith, 1997: 71-72). 
The final dimension of regionalism is institutional and relates to the 
emergence of organisation, giving shape to the region in a legal and institutional 
sense (with different levels of regional organisation) and providing some 'rules of 
the game' within the region. This element of design and conscious policy is central 
to regionalism, and thus regionalism is a kind of state project (Gamble and Payne, 
1996: 250; Smith, 1997: 71, 73). 
One form of regionalism is the regional integration process; since World 
War II many attempts have been made all over the world to embark on some kind 
\ 
of integration. The experiences of these processes, however, have been Ijlfgely 
negative and in the 1970s the academic interest in regional arrangements declined. 
In the 1990s, several developments have taken place with new regional 
formations emergmg and old regional organisations being reactivated. 
16 Geographically, regions are difficult to establish because the regional boundaries 
determined for one purpose are not necessarily appropriate for others, and the chosen dividing 
lines can change or come to require a change, or they can overlap (Claude, 1956: 96). 
Furthermore, physical contiguity can be misleading because technology, history and culture can 
make 'effective distance' differ from linear distance; and perceptions of what constitutes _a region 
- are affected by different political interests (Nye, 1971: 7). Thus, there are no 'natural' regions. 
17 The functional boundaries can shift and overlap or merge in the same way as the 
geographical boundaries ofregtOns (Smith, 1997: 73y. 
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Concomitantly, the renewed academic interest in regionalism, often summarised as 
the new regionalism, has emerged (Hettne, 1996: 160). 
Hettne (1996: 161) and Hurrell (1995: 332) point out several differences 
between regionalism and the new regionalism (both concepts used as ideal types), 
and they include: 
• Regionalism was formed in a bipolar Cold War context, while the new 
regionalism is taking shape in a multi polar world order in which the former 
superpowers are being downgraded to regional powers, competing with other 
emerging regional powers. 
• Whereas regionalism was created from above by the superpowers, the new 
regionalism is a more spontaneous process emerging from below18 from 
within the region with other (non-~tate) actors, such as firms, and labour 
unions, playing an increasingly important role. This trend is also accompanied 
by a marked increase in regional awareness or consciousness. 
• Regionalism was inward-oriented and protectionist as far as the economIC 
integration process was concerned. The new regionalism is described as 'open' 
and thus compatible with the interdependent world economy. 
• Whereas regionalism was specific in its objectives (security OE economically 
oriented), the new regionalism is a multi-oriented process that inc1ude!f trade 
and economic integration, -environment, social policy, security and 
democracy. The shift is also a result of the end of the Cold War and 
decentralisationiregionalisation of security concerns, and of developments in 
the global economy. 
18 Buzan et al. (1998: 200) claim that bottom-up regions exist independently within the 
- international system and top-down regions exist because of the international system. They go on 
to say that regions are generally a mixture of bottom-up and top-down processes, with one being 
clearly dominant. 
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• Regionalism dealt with the relations between formally sovereign states, while 
the new regionalism forms part of a global structural transformation in which 
non-state actors are active at several levels of the global system. 
• While regionalism was institutionalised, the new forms of regionalism are 
characterised by different levels of institutionalisation, many groups 
consciously avoiding institutional and bureaucratic structures. 
The resurgence of regionalism, especially in developing areas of the Third 
World, raises a question as to whether these regional arrangements will be 
successful this time around, especially those trying to address security issues. The 
transactionalist approach to the integration process could provide some insight into 
this question. 
2.1.5. The Transactionalist Approach and the Concept of a Security 
Community 
Like other approaches to integration, the transactionalist approach, also 
referred to as the pluralist or communications approach, concerns itself largely 
with the problem of the malfunctioning of the multi-state system 1md with the 
development of peaceful relations among nations. The goal of the integfation 
process is the attainment of peace and security in the international system and 
formation of a community of states (Pentland, 1973: 29-30). 
In the transactionalist view, a community cannot exist unless its members 
are interdependent. Since interdependence can be established by a network of 
mutual transactions, the intensity and scope of transactions between given groups 
of actors/units is an indicator of a sense of community in a given territory. In 
addition, the flow of transactions must be accompanied by the development of 
-mutual responsiveness (i.e. demands communicated through the system must 
receive an adequate response within a certain{,eriod of time) (Hodges, 1978: 244), 
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so that the resolution of conflicts through violence is inconceivable in the near 
future (Pentland, 1973: 38). 
The transactionalist approach also has an important socio-psychological 
dimension, because its adherents suggest that an increase in transaction flows 
between political units in a given region is the result of a learning process in which 
actors become accustomed to using new common procedures, and to developing a 
structure of common values. Changes in the political attitudes and behaviour of 
individuals are central to the creation of communities of states (Hodges, 1978: 
244). 
One of the best-known transactionalist scholars, Karl Deutsch, emphasises 
the role of transactions between people as both the indicators of their attitudes 
towards each other and as the causes of interdependence within the community. 
Drawing on historical cases, Deutsch and his associates (Dougherty and 
Pfaltzgraff, 1971: 286) examined ten cases 19 of integration and disintegration at 
the national level to address the problem of the elimination of war and the building 
of a political community among nations. Although the cases studied were 
examples of building political communities at the national level, th~ assumption 
was made that they were also relevant to an understanding of the integwtion 
process at international level, because -of the similarities or isomorphism in the 
19 Those cases were: the union of the American colonies into the United States in 1789, its 
break up in the civil war, and the reunion that followed; the gradual development of union 
between England and Scotland and its consummation in 1707; the break-up of the union between 
Ireland and United Kingdom in 1921; the struggle for German unity since the Middle Ages, 
culminating in the unification of Germany in 1871; the problem of Italian unity since the end of 
the eighteenth century, culminating in the unification of Italy in 1859-1860; the long preservation 
and final dissolution in 1918 of the Habsburg Empire; the union of Norway and Sweden in 1814 
-and their separation in 1905; the gradual integration of Switzerland that was completed in 1848; 
the union of England with Wales after 1485; and the formation of England itself in the Middle 
Ages (Deutsch et al., 1957: 16-1i). 
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peaceful process of community building at both the national and international 
levels. 
In Political Community and the North Atlantic Area, Deutsch (Deutsch et 
al., 1957: 5) puts forward several definitions to begin his analysis. He defines 
political community as a social group with a process of political communication 
among its members, some machinery for the enforcement of rules, and some 
popular habits of compliance.2o Political communities that have managed to 
eliminate war and the expectation of war within their boundaries are security 
communities. A security community is a group of people that has become 
integrated. He further defines integration as the attainment, within a territory, of a 
sense of community21 and of institutions and practices strong and widespread 
enough to assure, for a long time, dependable expectations of peaceful change22 
among the population. 
According to Deutsch (1968: 193; Deutsch et al., 1957: 6) there are two 
types of security community: amalgamated and pluralistic. Amalgamation is the 
formal merger of two or more previously independent units into a single larger 
unit, with some type of common government after amalgamation. This common 
\ 
government may be unitary or federal. Therefore, any well-integrated nation-state 
,I 
is such an amalgamated security co~munity. A pluralistic security community 
retains the legal independence of separate governments.23 
20 Deutsch (1968: 160-161) has later refonnulated this definition and defined a political 
community as a relevant degree of interdependence. He also distinguished a community of 
conflict from community of interest. 
21 Sense of community is a belief on the part of individuals in a group that they have come to 
an agreement to resolve common social problems by the processes of peaceful change (Deutsch et 
al., 1957: 5). 
22 A peaceful change is the resolution of social problems, nonnally by institutionalised 
_ procedures, without resort to large-scale physical force (Deutsch eral., 1957: 5). . 
23 Depending on whether a community has crossed the amalgamation orland integration 
threshold, Deutsch (Deutschet-al., 1957: 7) distinguishes a pluralistic security community, an 
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Deutsch (1968: 195; Deutsch et at., 1957: 28, 48-58) maintains that both 
amalgamated and pluralistic security communities are practical ways to achieve 
integration. He cites twelve background conditions that appear to be essential (but 
probably not sufficient) for the success of an amalgamated security community: 
• mutual compatibility of the main values relevant for political behaviour; 
• a distinctive and attractive way of life with some measure of social innovation 
as against the recent past; 
• the widespread expectations of stronger and rewarding economic ties or joint 
rewards/gains for the participating units; 
• a marked increase in the political and administrative capabilities of at least 
some of the participating units; 
• superior economic growth in at least some participating units as compared to 
the recent past or neighbouring territories outside the area of prospective 
integration; 
• some substantial unbroken links of social communication across the mutual 
boundaries of the territories to be integrated, and across the barriers of 
politically relevant strata within them; 
• broadening of the political, social or economic elite within at\least some of 
political units, and within the emerging larger community as a whole; J 
• relatively high geographic and-social mobility of people, at least among the 
politically relevant strata; 
• multiplicity of the scope of mutual communications and transactions with 
corresponding institutional framework; 
• some overall balance in the flows of communications and transactions among 
the units to be amalgamated, such as balance of rewards between the different 
amalgamated security community, an amalgamated 'insecurity' community, and a non-
amalgamated 'insecurity' community. 
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participating territories, balance of initiatives originating in these territories, 
and balance of respect between these parties; 
• a significant frequency of some interchange in group roles (such as being in a 
majority or a minority) among the political units; and 
• considerable mutual predictability of behaviour. 
Even in the presence of these conditions favourable to integration, some 
background conditions conducive to disintegration could prevent, destroy, or at 
least endanger an amalgamated security community, though these conditions are 
not sufficient by themselves to produce disintegration. They include: 
• any steep increase in economic, military, or political burdens on the 
community or on any participating unit (especially if this increase in burdens 
comes at an early stage of the ints:gration process, before integration has 
become consolidated by the learning of deep political loyalties and habits); 
• a rapid increase in social mobilisation and political participation, faster than 
the process of civic assimilation to the common political culture of the 
community; 
• a rapid increase in regional, economic, cultural, social, linguistic, or ethnic 
differentiation, faster and stronger than any compensating integr~tive process; 
• a serious decline in the political or administrative capabilities ~f the 
government and the political elite, relative to the current tasks and burdens 
with which they have to cope; 
• a relative closure of the established political elite, slowing drastically the entry 
of new members and ideas, and consequently encouraging the emergence of 
the hostile counter-elites of frustrated potential elite members; 
• a failure of the government and elite to carry out in time needed the reforms 
and adjustments wanted or expected by the popUlation; or failure to adjust in 
time to the imminent decline or loss of some privileged or dominant minority 
position (Deutsch, 1968: 195-196; Deutsch et at., 1957: 59-64). 
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The attainment of a pluralistic security community can be supported by any 
of the background conditions favourable to the success of an amalgamated security 
community on the one hand, and can be hindered by the conditions or processes 
harmful to the latter on the other (Deutsch et at., 1957: 65). 
Deutsch (1968: 196; Dougherty and Pfaltzgraff, 1971: 286-287) claims that 
pluralistic security communities are easier to establish and to maintain than 
amalgamated security communities and hence a more effective way to keep the 
peace among their members. They seem to require only three main conditions for 
their existence: 
• compatibility of major political values; 
• capacity of the governments and politically relevant strata of the participating 
countries to respond to one another 'Is messages, needs, and actions quickly, 
adequately, and without resorting to violence; and 
• mutual predictability of the relevant aspects of one another's political, 
economic, and social behaviour (but these relevant aspects are far fewer in the 
case of a pluralistic security community than they would be in amalgamated 
one). 
The essential background conditions do not come into existente all at once 
J 
and they are not established in any particular fixed order. Rather, they can be 
assembled in almost any sequence (Deutsch, 1968: 196; Deutsch et at., 1957: 70). 
Once the background conditions come to existence the process of integration can 
begin. 
The take-off of the integration process does not imply a sudden, new 
beginning, but rather a marked quickening or strengthening of the political process 
moving toward integration. The take-off can be considered to have occurred as 
soon as at least one major social or political group, or political institution, has 
become committed to the goal of integration (Deutsch et at., 1957: 85). 
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The process of integration often begins around a core area consisting of one 
or more political units that are stronger and more developed than other political 
units, and in some significant respects more advanced and attractive. Other 
circumstances favourable to the integration process are the domination of political 
divisions which cut across the political units and regions to be integrated, the 
innovation and originality of emerging institutions, and willingness of political 
elites to bring about major political compromises in order to hold together 
movements advocating integration and cross-class coalitions (Deutsch, 1968: 196-
199; Deutsch et at., 1957: 72, 76, 88, 90, 114). 
Many movements for integration demonstrate, according to Deutsch 
(1968:199), a succession of three stages. The first stage is characterised by the 
leadership of the intellectuals. This is followed by a stage for the politicians, when 
broader interest groups begin to support the integration movement. Finally, this 
stage flows into the stage of mass movements and/or large-scale elite politics, and 
the issue of political integration becomes intensely practical. 
A pluralistic security community seems to require simpler processes in 
order to come into existence. Deutsch (1968: 201) asserts that the main process 
\ 
required is an increasing unattractiveness and improbability of war amon,g the 
political units or the emerging plurali.stic security community, as perceived by 
their governments, elites and populations. The second process is the spread of 
intellectual movements and traditions advocating integration, and thus preparing 
the political climate for it. Another process is the development and practice of 
habits and skills leading to mutual attention, communication, and responsiveness 
among political entities to be integrated. This process allows the preservation of 
the autonomy and substantial sovereignty of the participating units, and stable 
expectations of peace and peaceful change among them .. 
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2.2. Methodological Considerations and the Relevance of the 
Transactionalist Approach for African States 
The methodological problem of the transactionalist approach in general is the 
fact that its adherents operate with a vague terminology (mutual relevance, mutual 
responsiveness, adequate response, and so on). Their variables are difficult to 
measure. Firstly, because they have quantitative as well as qualitative dimensions. 
Inglehart (Hodges, 1978: 248) for example contends that the crucial factor is not 
the act of transaction but the attitude that underlies it. Secondly, the analysis of 
transaction flows is limited only to available data, which inevitably excludes much 
of the past. Thus, the horizontal (spatial) or vertical (temporal) comparison of 
specific variables is difficult. 
Moreover, the transactionalist approach does not consider the relevance of 
coercion and the role of conflict as an integrating force. For example, scholars 
agree that the experience of World War II was important, if not crucial, as a 
catalyst in the European integration process (Dougherty and Pfaltzgraff, 1971: 
311). 
\ 
In addition, even though the transactionalist approach may be useful III 
delineating potential regions as suitable cases for integration on the basis of 
transaction flows and consequent increase in community formation, it is doubtful 
whether causal relationships can be demonstrated. Hodges (1978: 249) claims that 
the predictive power of the transactionalist approach may be greatest in a negative 
sense - to point out regions in which the absence of a network of mutual 
transactions makes integration unlikely or unsuccessful. 
Further methodologi_~al considerations relate to a study Deutsch conducted 
with his associates. Deutsch (Deutsch et at., 1957: -17) pointed out several 
deficiencies of the study. Firstly, the number of cases was small and this increased 
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the possibility of a sampling error. Consequently, the results were stated only in 
terms of probabilities. Secondly, the 'samples' were taken from one specific 
geographic and cultural area (North Atlantic area) and therefore the issue of 
political communities in other regions and their comparison to the studied region 
was disregarded (Deutsch et at., 1957: 20). 
On the positive side, it can be noted that since one of the problems of other 
approaches to integration was the absence of the 'final products' of the regional 
integration processes (their main case study was the ongoing process of European 
integration), the fact that Deutsch's conclusions were developed on the basis of 
historical cases can be regarded as a positive element. However, it seems likely 
that the integration process of developed states is something different from the 
-. 
integration process that created those states in the first place (Morgan, 1981: 214), 
and that integration of different political units in Europe before the twentieth 
century is qualitatively different from the internal integration of sovereign states 
on the African continent of the twentieth and twenty first centuries (see chapter 3). 
With these pros and cons in mind, it can be concluded that the study and 
subsequent theoretical conclusions of Deutsch and his associates i~ nevertheless 
relevant and suggestive for the study of the integration processes on the African 
continent. Firstly, following the example of developed states, African states are 
aspiring to evolve into strong, cohesive and integrated entities. Deutsch's study is 
therefore significant in cases where states are still struggling to build a· security 
community within their borders, because it was based on selected historical case-
studies of national (dis)integration. In these cases, however, the assumption is 
made that the internal situation in many African states resembles in several ways 
the situation before the emergence of coherent and integrated European states. 
Secondly, today, African states find it more difficult to resort to violence 
and coercion as a means o(state-making and !lation-building than Western states a 
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few centuries ago, since this is regarded as unacceptable by the international 
community. In addition, gross violations of human rights, genocidal campaigns, 
political repression and violence can result in the withholding of aid, loans and 
other resources by the international community, and this can further obstruct the 
state-making process in countries with scarce resources. The conclusions based on 
case studies of peaceful integration processes in the past can suggest ways for 
African states to achieve the goal of becoming amalgamated security communities 
by peaceful means. 
Thirdly, based on Deutsch's findings regarding conditions conducive to 
disintegration, some conclusions can be made about the factors preventing African 
states from ensuring peace and security within their borders. 
Fourthly, although it could be arguea that the increasing interdependence 
and multiple transactions connecting countries and peoples all over the world 
through the process of globalisation render the transactionalist approach 
redundant, in the case of African states this is not so. The level of transactions 
between African states in a region, especially on trade, is in most cases relatively 
low compared to the level of their transactions with developed countries. Also, 
\ 
African states have troubles engaging in the globalisation processes and increpsing 
the level and diversity of transactions with other countries due to their economic 
and political position in the world system. This position is also a consequence of 
the unfinished processes of state-making and nation-building. 
Finally, the transactionalist approach can be helpful in explaining why the 
absence of an amalgamated security community within the borders of many 
African states can obstruct the building of a pluralistic security community among 
these states. Here, the assumption is made that the absence of major conflicts 
among African states (i.e. negative peace) does not indicate that these states have 
managed to establish a pluralistic security community and through that, ensure 
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positive peace,24 especially because the internal and transnational insecurities are 
obstructing such establishment. These issues are the subject of the next three 
chapters. 
J 
24 Positive peace involves more than a mere absence of war and conflict between states. It is 
based on mutual interdependence and requires co-operation between states or fonnally warring 
parties, which is mutually berieficial. 
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3. STATE AND INTEGRATION 
Deutsch and his colleagues studied the peaceful processes of integration. 
However, as Puchala (Hodges, 1978: 238) has noted, most cases of national 
integration in Europe are more appropriately regarded and studied as ones of 
amalgamation by imperialism (i.e. amalgamation by force and violence) rather 
than as examples of the peaceful integration process. It seems that force and 
violence figure prominently in the agenda of state-makers on the African 
continent, and therefore it is feasible that the study and better understanding of the 
history of state-making in Europe could help to shed light on security and other 
pressing issues facing non-European states, as contended by Tilly and Ayoob (Van 
de Goor et at., 1996: 6). 
3.1. The Emergence of Modern States in Europe and their Integration 
after World War II 
The process of state-making has been defined by Cohen, Brown and 
" 
Organ ski (Ayoob, 1996: 69) as primitiye central state power accumulation. State-
making must include the following: the expansion and consolidation of the 
territorial and demographic domain under a political authority, including the 
imposition of order on contested territorial and demographic space (war); the 
maintenance of order in the territory where, and over the population on whom, 
such order has already been imposed (policing); and the extraction of resources 
from the territory and the population under the control of the state essential to 
support not only war-making and policing activities but _also to maintain the state 
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apparatus needed to carryon routine administration, deepen the state's penetration 
of society and serve its symbolic purposes (taxation).25 
The process of state-making thus results in empirical statehood. The criteria 
for this statehood recognised by positive international law include the following 
elements: a delimited territory, a stable popUlation, and reliable and efficient 
government with the will and capacity to carry out international obligations. The 
normative aspect of statehood - juridical statehood - is the formal declaration of 
supremacy over all domestic authorities and, at the international level, moral and 
legal equality to all other states (Jackson, 1990: 53,61). 
The earliest modem European states exhibited a degree of empirical 
statehood: their reality consisted of a populated territory under a ruler who claimed 
a territory as his realm and a population as"·his subjects and was able to enforce 
this claim. Kings possessed a government apparatus that could project royal power 
and prerogatives both internally and externally. This apparatus might still have 
been rudimentary, but it was enough to sustain the ruler both domestically and 
internationally, and if not, the ruler and his realm were replaced by another 
(Jackson, 1990: 51-52). 
\ 
Before a king could ensure his realm and population, he had to pacif'y his 
SUbjects. The European process of state-making can thus be described as a struggle 
between local leaders and a centralising power. Any attempt by a centralising 
power to impose central authority throughout the territory of the state could be met 
with resistance. Ultimately, Europe's numerous little kingdoms and counties 
produced a far smaller number of states. However, none of these rulers were 
25 Tilly (1985: 186) similarly argues that the state and its agents engage in four different 
activities that fall under organised violence: elimination or neutralisation of rivals outside the 
territories where they have clear and continuous priority as wielders of force (war-making), 
elimination or neutralisation of their rivals inside those territories (-state-making), elimination or 
-neutralisation of the enemies of their clients (protection of the citizens), and acquisition of the 
means of carrying out the first tIu:.ee activities (extractiqn of resources). 
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prepared to surrender power without a fight (Van de Goor et at., 1996: 7), and the 
violence generated during the process of state-making was the result of actions 
undertaken both by a centralising power and by recalcitrant elements within the 
population who resisted attempts to impose order (Ayoob, 1996: 70; Cohen et at., 
1981: 902). Strayer (Ayoob, 1991: 266) sums up the situation by saying that the 
European sovereign states of 1300 were stronger than any competing political 
entities, but they were still not very strong. In fact it took four or five centuries for 
these states to 'fix' their administrative deficiencies and transform the lukewarm 
loyalty of the populace into a sense of nationalism. 
Along with this internal pacification and domination aspect of state-
making, there was an external stimulus to create compact, stable and largely 
homogenous (i.e. strong) states. Since there. were neither internationally accepted 
norms of sovereignty nor internationally recognised borders, the emerging 
European states posed a serious threat to one another (Van de Goor et at., 1996: 
, 
7). Proximity and power meant there was always a strong possibility of war, the 
classical problem of the state system. Deterrence, alliances and the balance of 
power were responses to it (Jackson, 1990: 52). This geopolitical pressure on the 
\ 
leaders of emerging states compelled them to mobilise their societies against 
,I 
external threats. The raising of armies for the survival of the state as well as 
acquisition of resources to maintain them (taxation) was therefore essential. The 
need for revenue in the form of taxes led to the realisation that economic growth 
and development were vital for the survival of the state (Van de Goor et at., 1996: 
7; Tilly, 1975: 23). 
Since the development process in Europe depended on external threats, it is 
also described as a pessimistic model of development. Van de Goor et at. (1996: 
7) claim that, on the one hand, a military force was indispensable to deter and fight 
against external threats, and development was thus essential for a state to obtain 
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more revenue in the form of taxes for the acquisition of its military force. On the 
other hand, the acquisition of military force was necessary to maintain peace and 
thus enable development and economic growth of a state. As a result, competition 
among states as regards development and the acquisition of military force also 
encouraged state-making and was one of the main reasons for the eventual global 
hegemony of Europe (Jackson, 1990: 52). 
The European model also shows that, with some exceptions, state-making 
usually preceded the emergence of nations and nation-states by several centuries. 
The formation of national states was therefore not simultaneous with the 
emergence of nation-states26 in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. The latter 
have additionally contributed to the effective resolution of the internal dimension 
of security in (mostly Western) European "states. Hence, its external orientation 
became politically and conceptually unquestioned (Ayoob, 1996: 70; Krause, 
1998: 128). 
The successful internal pacification eventually enabled the states of 
Western Europe and North America to emerge as responsive and representative 
national states at the beginning of the twentieth century. These were the products 
\ 
of the state-making process that had unfolded for at least three or four hundred 
I 
years (Ayoob, 1996: 72, 76). Today, Western states set the standards for effective 
statehood as well as for the humane and civilised treatment of their citizens, and 
successfully claim the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force within 
their territories (Weber, 1986: 38). They are successful in simultaneously meeting 
the basic needs of the large majority of their populations, protecting their human 
rights, and promoting and guaranteeing political participation. However, this level 
26 Tilly (Ayoob, 1996: 70rhas defined national states as relatively centralised, differentiated, 
and autonomous organisations successfully claiming priority in th€ use of force within the large, 
contiguous and clearly bounded territories. Nation-states are those states whose peoples share a 
strong linguistic, religious, and ~bolic identity. 
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of democracy and respect for human rights emerged as the final stage of the state-
making process and not at the latter's expense (Ayoob, 1996: 84). 
In addition, Western states are national economies in a sense that economic 
development takes place in a national space, regulated and nurtured by the state. 
The national economy normally comprises the main sectors needed for its 
reproduction, although there is a high level of exchange with other economies. The 
economy is also homogenous, so that different sectors are at similar levels of 
development and there is a very high degree of cross- and inter-sectoral exchange 
(Sorensen, 1997: 258). 
Moreover, Western European states exhibit what Sorensen (1997: 261-262) 
terms post modernity. The post modem forms of political organisation comprise 
political space organised on a non-state territorial basis as in the European Union 
(EU). In the history of the European integration process, security considerations 
were an essential part of the early advances made in the co-operation between 
Germany and France. However, increased co-operation and supranational 
decision-making between EU member states can now be seen as the acquisition of 
competitive advantages in the light of increasing economic globalisation. 
\ . What is important to note here is that European states, despIte having 
, 
opposing views and conflicting interests on many issues, have managed to 
establish a pluralistic security community through the process of integration. The 
conflict-ridden Western European international system was thus transformed into 
the system embodied in the EU with the establishment of a single market and 
adoption of common policies in a number of major fields, including agriculture, 
regional aid, energy, transport and competition, among others. Decisions are made 
by the majority voting on some matters which are considered less controversial, 
--
and by inter-governmental bargaining on more controversial matters such as 
foreign and defence policies. The result of this decision-making is the so-called 
33 
European legislation, which is binding on all member states. Furthermore, the 
supranational institutions - the Commission, the Court of Justice and the 
Parliament - symbolically as well as in practice mark the erosion of the 
sovereignty of Western European states (Anderson, 1996: 153, 157). 
3.2. State-Making and the Security Predicament of African States 
Western European states have thus managed to achieve domestic as well as 
regional peace. Moreover, their juridical statehood developed concomitantly with 
empirical statehood and it is supported by it. 
The history and formation of African states contrasts with the erstwhile 
emergent European states. The internal aspect of state-making is different. Most 
African countries have not evolved gradually over time but were geographically 
designed and created by outsiders. In comparison with European states, there has 
been no opportunity for binding factors to take root. As a result, some of the 
traditional structures have remained intact, which means that African states lack a 
unifying force of nationalism at the state level (Van de Goor et al., 19~6: 7). 
The formal colonisation of Africa and demarcation of the continent into 
states between 1885 and 1902 replaced the diversity of forms of political entities, 
characteristic for pre-colonial Africa, with the European model of the nation-state 
(Herbst, 1996/97: 120). However, there was nothing 'national' about po st., colonial 
African states. Borders, arbitrarily drawn by colonial powers, were a result of 
colonial powers' own appetites and bargains. They cut across ethnic, religious and 
linguistic ties, dismembering established political units and joining multiple pre-
colonial political entities into uneasy administrative units (Thomas and Mazrui, 
_1992: 160). 
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African states were thus not a product of a peaceful or coercive integration 
process, and one of the important tasks of African statesmen was therefore to 
transform the state into a cohesive and integrated political, social and economic 
unit and to create a nation27 within the inherited borders in accordance with the 
European model. Simply stated, the task consisted of shifting the loyalties from 
different ethnicities, tribes, religious groups or former political entities to a new 
state. It can be argued that this resembled the challenge of forming an 
amalgamated security community but within already fixed borders. 
Jackson (1992: 1) claims that citizenship in African states means less than 
membership in a family, clan, religious sect or ethnic community. Thomas and 
Mazrui (1992: 160) make a similar observation by pointing out that different 
groups in African states maintain their separate ethnic identities by being ruled in 
part through their own native institutions. At the same time, different sections of 
the population perceive each other as strangers, sometimes as aliens, increasingly 
as rivals and potential enemies. 
The state, or better the regime in power, which is perceived as representing the 
interests of a particular ethnic/social stratum or an economic/military elite, must 
\ 
compete for loyalty and resources with different social groups (Thomas and 
J 
Mazrui, 1992: 160). It is not surprising, therefore, that many African regimes were 
or are being challenged by insurgent or rebel movements.28 
27 In this thesis, the concept of a nation is understood in the sense of 'national unity', which is 
established, according to Rustow (1970: 350), when the majority of citizens of a country do not 
doubt about belonging to a certain political community or do not have any mental reservations 
about belonging to it. This means that a nation is not necessarily ethnically homogenous but can 
consist of ethnically diverse groups, and that its formation is not based on ethnicity-destruction 
but ethnicity-inc1usion. 
28 These have frequently undermined the notion of a sovereign-state by conducting (in)formal 
political, economic and diplomatic relations with other states and by having their own 'foreign 
policies' (Clapham, 1998: 152)._ 
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When the competition for resources and loyalty becomes so intense that it 
results in conflict, the regime can privatise national security by deploying force 
and violence for personal and private ends, and thus national security becomes 
regime security. This results in a tension between regime security and 
human/individual or communal/group security.29 The regime often disregards and 
even threatens the security of individuals or groups within its jurisdiction and 
violates their human rights in order to ensure its own security. 
Jackson (Ayoob, 1991: 129; Krause, 1998: 129) talks about the "paradox of 
the state", where the most important threats to security in the Third World, and 
particularly in Africa, arise from states and regimes and are directed against 
individuals and local communities. African statesmen may thus abstain from 
violence in their international relations but be abusive and coercive in their 
domestic conduct, which frequently provokes internal disorder and violence 
(Jackson, 1990: 154). Cohen et al. (1981: 902, 904) assert that this political 
violence in former colonies is a function of the conflicts inherent in the process of 
primitive central state power accumulation that was characteristic for the European 
state-making in the past, and that it is brought about by the aggreSSIve 
expansionism of the state. 
The international context of African states also differs from the European 
model of state-making. In the contemporary world, states are in principle protected 
by the internationally accepted principle of sovereignty and internationally 
recognised national borders. Statesmen no longer need to mobilise their societies 
against external threats, and the absence of a hostile international environment 
removed the incentive for internal integration. Van de Goor et al. (1996: 8) note 
that the result has been a reversed process of state-making, since the creation of 
29 For discussion of the di-ff@fent levels of security., see section 4.1. 
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the state preceded that of a national army. It could be argued that unlike the 
process of European state-making, the principles of sovereignty, territorial 
integrity and non-intervention are detrimental to state-making in African states. 
Although the reality did not match the idea of an amalgamated security 
community, African states did not disintegrate and were preserved by juridical 
statehood. This means that after decolonisation, African states have been 
recognised as sovereign entities by the international community. Consequently, 
they possess the same rights and responsibilities as all other sovereign states, 
despite the fact that many formally recognised states disclose limited empirical 
statehood30 and their populations do not enjoy many of the advantages 
traditionally associated with independent statehood (Jackson, 1990: 21). Jackson 
(1990; 1992) refers to such states as quasi-states. 
In spite of their 'quasi-statehood', African states committed themselves to 
the existing borders in the framework of the OAD by accepting the principles of 
sovereign equality of states, non-interference in the internal affairs of states, and 
respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of each state and for its 
inalienable right to independent existence.3 ! 
This was also possible because of the Cold War situation. Wit~ the 
exception of the Congo crisis (1960-.1965),32 the global strategic competition 
30 Jackson (1992: 8) contends that if a leader was backed by the army, commanded the 
government bureaucracy, was in possession of the treasury and the central bank, controlled the 
conduits of foreign loans and grants and was supported by key ethnic leaders, this usually 
sufficed for control of the 'empirical state'. Such control was tenuous: if different strategic 
locations, such as the presidential palace, army barracks, radio station, airport, railway terminals, 
major roads, were controlled, then so, probably was the state. Diplomatic recognition was 
automatically extended to the leaders in command of these locations, even if they were not in 
control of the rest of the country..: 
31 These principles were included in the Charter of the Organisation of African Unity. 
32 After the surprising and premature independence of Belgian Congo, the new state collapsed 
into virtual disorder with a military mutiny and secessions occurring shortly after the 
independence. The secessions in Katanga and in Stmthem Kasai were overtly supported by 
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between the United States (US) and the Soviet Union discouraged external threats 
to African borders since one of the implicit rules of the Cold War was that 
supporting efforts to change boundaries was not part of the game (Herbst, 
1996/97: 121). The superpowers feared the chaos that might have resulted from 
such changes, and therefore they were willing to help African states crush ethnic 
rebellions or threats from neighbouring countries (Herbst, 1992: 19), and to 
preserve their quasi-statehood at the same time. 
Thus, quasi-states cannot logically collapse into a state of nature because 
their sovereignty is derived not internally from empirical statehood but externally 
from the state-system whose members have decided that these jurisdictions would 
not disappear. In this way, quasi-states tum Hobbes inside out (Jackson, 1990: 
168-169): they are far more likely to experience the domestic state ofnature33 than 
engage in international conflicts. 
As previously noted, on account of the Cold War rivalries, quasi-statehood 
was enough for African states to be accepted into the international community. In 
addition, all kinds of rulers were tolerated and supported. People in power often 
privati sed the state and used it for personal enrichment and repression. Thus, the 
\ 
initial expectations about the role the post-colonial state would playas the prime 
mover of development34 were not met, ~ince development of the country was not a 
Belgian military intervention and covertly by the US, since both provinces were resource-laden 
territories. The Soviet Union supported the union of the country, advocated by prime-minister 
Lumumba, which was finally preserved once Congo was secured as a US sphere of influence (see 
for example Gibbs, 2000 or Kabongo, 1988). 
33 Little (Buzan, 1988: 22) defines 'anarchic states' as states in which power is openly 
contested by the use of force. The state may still exist in some formal and legal sense, but the 
power within it is so fragmented, and legitimacy so weak, that it is impossible for any group to 
obtain the degree of dominance necessary for central governing control. Such states exist in a 
condition of civil war, and this-reflects the anarchic structure ofthe international system. 
34 The post-colonial state was planned to playa major role in development and transformation 
of society by implementing policies in agriculture, industrialisation, education and other sectors. 
For example, the state was to direct the economy alld seek to extract a surplus, which it would 
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priority and the state became "a cash cow to be milked" (Adebayo and Landsberg, 
2000: 14). 
The role initially attributed to independent African states changed from the 
prime mover of development to that of its main obstacle (Doornbos, 1990: 183). 
Privatisation of the state by different African leaders resulted in inefficiency, 
corruption and mismanagement in numerous African states. This, combined with 
the oil crises, declining commodity prices, and falling foreign investment and 
assistance, resulted in declines in per-capita income, mass poverty, an inability to 
service contractual obligations and foreign debts, and the erosion of previous 
achievements in the areas of health, education, foreign trade, agricultural 
investment, rural development, infrastructural development, and the provision of 
basic human needs (Ihonvbere, 1994: 117-118). This economic and social crisis on 
the continent has reduced the relevance of the state to the lives of its citizens, 
heightened conflicts, antagonisms and tensions, eroded the social fabric of African 
societies (Bratton and Van de Walle, 1997: 99-100), and contributed to the 
increased human and communal insecurity on the continent. 
In addition, the economic crisis that became evident in the early 1980s 
\ 
undercut the material foundations of African rulers. With increasingly fewer 
,I 
resources to distribute, rulers faced a growing problem of how to retain control of 
clientelist networks.35 At the same time, their political legitimacy was eroded since 
they were incapable of solving the basic problems of socio-economic and political 
development. As internal discontent grew, African regimes become more 
then redirect partly for the maintenance and expansion of its own apparatus, and also for 
redistribution to other sectors (Doornbos, 1990: 182-183). 
35 Clientelism is a term re~rring to a practice of rulers in many Third World states, aimed at 
maintaining the support and loyalty of their followers. The loyalty is sustained by the distribution 
_ of and access to the state's resources in the form of jobs (for- example, important political, 
bureaucratic or military/police positions in the state with the attendant benefits are allocated to 
'clients'), contracts, loans, licenees, import permits, and the like (Sorensen, 1997: 260). 
39 
repreSSIve. Repression, however, was politically costly; not just because it 
produced a cycle of political violence, but also because it diverted state resources 
from more productive activities (Chabal, 1998: 292). 
Therefore, the political-economic crisis resulted, first, in spontaneous 
popular protests against the crisis; second, struggles over the rules and resources 
for political liberalisation; and third, installation of some kind of new regime 
(Bratton and Van de Walle, 1997: 98-100; Clapham, 1998: 147-148). Domestic 
pressures were combined with the economic conditionality of the international 
financial institutions and Western governments, which started in the 1980s, and 
political conditionality, which followed in the 1990s. As a result of these changes 
most African leaders embarked on economic and political reforms to 'appease' 
domestic and foreign pressures. However, itis questionable how these reforms can 
be conducive to state-making and nation-building in African states. 
As previously pointed out, the problems of insecurity and instability in 
African states are related to the process of state-making and nation-building. 
However, while in the European history the security problems of emerging states 
were mainly resolved by force and violence, such means of state-making and 
\ 
nation-building are seen as unacceptable today. The study of the peaceful 
,I 
integration processes and the attainment of security communities at the state as 
well as regional level is thus relevant for African countries since they cannot resort 
to violence to internally pacify their populations, because war36 and massive 
36 In its Article 111, the Charter of the United Nations (UN) states that one of the main 
purposes of the UN is to maintain international peace and security. To that end, the UN can take 
collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to the peace, and for the 
_ suppression of acts of aggression or other breaches of the peace; and bring about by peaceful 
means, and in conformity with the principles of justice and international law, adjustment or 
settlement of international dispmes or situations whicg might lead to a breach of the peace. 
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abuses of human rights37 have been 'outlawed' by the international community as 
legitimate means in politics. 
Even though political violence and oppression, massive abuses of human 
rights, intra-state conflicts, and the like demonstrate that norms or standards of the 
international community are not being observed in many African countries, the 
political conditionality of international organisations and donor community is 
compelling them to respect these standards, since a failure to do so can result in 
the withholding of aid and other assistance, which is vital for many of them. 
Consequently, African state-makers have to design their (security) policies 
in line with these circumstances at both the state and regional levels. Moreover, 
they need to consider the economic, social and environmental issues that 
contribute to insecurity in their states besides military and political ones. These 
issues have been labelled 'new security threats' and they provide the central focus 
of the so-called 'new security thinking', which will be the subject of the next 
chapter. 
37 The international community considers the so-called International Bill of Human Rights, 
composed of the Universal -Declaration of Human Rights, the International Covenant on 
_ Economic, Social and Cultural Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights, as the minimum standard of human rights and freedoms that (civilised) states have to 
respect. 
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4. The Debate Surrounding the Concept of security 
In the realist perspective of international relations, the concept of security 
was conceived of in military terms and it was state-centric. States were the referent 
objects of security and security was seen mostly as the absence of military threats. 
This traditional and Western-centric conception of security has been broadened 
and deepened, especially in recent years, to include threats arising from political, 
economic, social and environmental security sectors and operating at different 
levels of security. However, redefining the concept of security by including non-
military threats has implications for the concept of a security community as 
defined by Deutsch and his colleagues, as will be established bellow. 
Furthermore, since this new concept of security includes threats, which 
emerge as a consequence of poor economic and social situations in different 
developing countries, it needs to be linked to the process of development. The link 
between development and security was already recognised by Southern African 
Development Community (SAD C) member states in the Treaty of Windhoek 
(1992) by stating that the climate of peace, security and stability was h prerequisite 
,I 
for development. The former Secretary General of the SADC, Makoni (1994: 17), 
similarly acknowledged this link by stating that without peace, security and 
stability either within or between the countries, the benefits of comprehensive 
integration would always be undermined. However, the notion that security as a 
condition and development as a process are mutually reinforcing seems to be more 
accepted by the academic and international communities38 than the idea that 
38 Annan (1998; 2000) ancf13outros-Ghali (1992/93: 95) claim that sustainable development is 
_ essential for African states because poor economic performance-and/or underdevelopment can 
result in economic crisis and consequently exacerbate internal tensions, which can eventually lead 
to conflict. Solomon (1998) argues that there is ~ close relationship between security and 
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security is a prerequisite for development. Therefore, a security community among 
as well as within African states can only be assured if accompanied by 
development. In this chapter, the expanded concept of security and the relation 
between security and development will be explored. Moreover, an attempt will be 
made to redefine the concept of a security community in line with the new security 
thinking. 
4.1. New Approaches to Security 
The debate related to the concept of security originates in the realist school 
of international politics. According to realists, states as unitary actors operate in an 
anarchical international system and they face insecurities stemming from the 
nature of that system, including threats to their existence. To survive in such an 
environment and to ensure their security, states have to acquire more power than 
their adversaries, military power in particular.39 Therefore, the concept of security 
was originally state-centric, and threats to states were external and military in 
nature. In addition, the security of citizens was identified with, and guaranteed by, 
\ 
the security of the state (Krause and Williams, 1996: 232). 
! 
According to Ayoob (1991: 263), this realist concept of security IS 
Western-biased and needs to be redefined in order to analyse the security 
problematic of Third World states. It is being increasingly recognised that the 
nature of threats in these states is qualitatively different from threats traditionally 
development since it is difficult to attract investment in countries engaged in a civil war. This, in 
turn, has negative implications for development. Shoeman (1998: 13) similarly asserts that 
building and maintaining security can (and should) be reinforced by development, and vice versa. 
39 Lippmann's argument that a nation is secure to the extent to which it is not in danger of 
having to sacrifice its core values, if it wishes to avoid war, and is able, if challenged, to maintain 
-them by victory in such a war (Solomon, 1998), mainly summarises traditional (realist) views of 
security. 
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included in the realist concept of security. For example, the insecurity in African 
countries is caused by the illegitimacy of governments, ethnic rivalry, economic 
underdevelopment, and excessive external dependence (Zacarias, 1999: 142), 
among others. The insecurities arising from these circumstances are directly or 
indirectly linked to the problems of state-making and nation-building, and are 
therefore mostly internal in nature. 
For instance, one of the major sources of insecurity was and remains the 
problems of regime (in)security. These problems have encouraged unconstitutional 
interventions by armed forces and political opponents, as well as ethnic claims 
(Kacowicz, 1997: 373). Such internal threats to the security of African states have 
been acknowledged by Ayoob (1991: 259) who claims that security should be 
defined in relation to the vulnerabilities that1hreaten, or have a potential, to bring 
down or considerably weaken state structures and the regimes presiding over these 
structures. This definition assumes the primacy of political variables III 
determining the degree of security. Ayoob goes on to say that other types of 
vulnerabilities, such as economic or environmental, become components of his 
definition only if they become acute enough to take on overtly political 
\ 
dimensions. 
Although adopted for the speci':ll conditions of Third W orId states, this 
concept of security is still state- and regime-centric and does not take into 
consideration that the security of a state or regime is not necessarily synonymous 
with the security of the citizens living within that state (Booth, 1991: 5), as is 
generally the case in developed states. On the contrary, a regime or government 
can threaten the security of its people/citizens, either through action by employing 
oppressive policies or through inaction by its incapacity to sustain a good life for 
all (Venter, 1996: 162). Thus, it is necessary to separate analytically the 
insecurities threatening the existence of states and regimes representing them from 
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those threatening the existence of people(s), or combine state-centric approach 
with people-centric approach to address the problems of human and communal 
security. 
As a result of criticism, the narrow realist concept of security was expanded 
by different scholars; horizontally, to include other sectors alongside the military 
one, such as the political, economic, societal and environmental; and vertically, 
beyond its state-centric focus, by including different levels of security either down 
to the level of individual/human security and group/communal security, or up to 
the level of regional and international security as opposed to only state security40 
(Booth and Vale, 1995: 313; Krause, 1998: 126).41 New approaches, which are 
trying to deepen and broaden the concept of security, include critical42 and 
constructivist approaches, focusing on the processes through which individuals, 
groups, and threats become constructed as 'social facts', and the influence of such 
constructions on the security problematic. The basic claims of the critical and 
constructivist approaches are that security is not an objective condition, that 
threats to security are not only a matter of correctly perceiving a constellation of 
material forces, and that an object of security is not stable or unchanging, as 
\ 
postulated by realist scholars (Krause and Williams, 1996: 246). 
I 
40 In this thesis, the tenn 'national security' is synonymous with the integrated or holistic 
concept of security. The assumption is made that national security can only be achieved when the 
security of a state, regime, and the communities and individuals living within that state is ensured. 
Furthennore, the attainment of regional and international security is the necessary condition for 
maintaining national security. 
41 Krause (1998: 127) expressed a concern that the attempts to expand the agenda or the 
levels at which security is discussed would contribute to the loss of an analytic core for the 
concept of security. However, as argued by Buzan (1991: 368), these levels and sectors are more 
like analytical devices for breaking up an integratediholistic concept of security and different 
viewing platfonns from which the problem can be observed than self-contained areas for policy 
or analysis. 
42 Critical approaches conceive of security holistically and view (regional) security iii tenns 
-of the notion of community. Furthennore, these approaches are aimed not only at analysing 
reality, but changing it (Booth and Vale, 1995: 310, 3~4). 
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When trying to analyse the security problematic in the SADC regIOn, 
Zacarias (1999: 139, 144) uses a people-centric approach with a focus on human 
security. He defines security as " ... a condition of continuous fulfilment of human 
aspirations as guaranteed by a certain enabling environment, in which the human 
beings who inhabit it are assured that it will not be disrupted, especially by human 
action." He further maintains that the building blocks of the environment for 
security rest on three pillars: order, justice and peace. These pillars need to coexist 
in a society in a condition of dynamic equilibrium for security to be realised. 
Similarly, Booth and Vale (1995: 324) claim that in order to be lasting, 
security in the form of order, justice and peace must be owned by the people(s). 
Booth (1991: 319) builds on the people-centric approach and maintains that 
security (as the absence of threats) and emancipation (as the freeing of people 
from physical and human constraints, which stop them from carrying out what 
they would freely choose to do) are "two sides of the same coin". He uses the 
Kantian idea that people should be treated as ends and not means, and states as 
means and not ends, to support his argument that individuals are the ultimate 
referent of security. 
\ 
Here, the question arises as to which definition of security is the ,)11ost 
useful for the analysis of the security problematic of African states, and SADC 
member states in particular. As argued, definitions focusing on only one aspect of 
the security problematic have to be put aside or incorporated into a more general 
definition of security. 
Buzan and his associates (Buzan et aI., 1998: 21, 23-24) attempt to form 
such a general definition, which includes different levels as well as different 
sectors of security, by using the constructivist approach. Accordingly, they claim 
that security is about survival. Threats are not always physical, so they should 
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preferably be linked to the notion of survival especially when the referent object43 
is not the state but the nation, ethnicity or some other identity group (Krause, 
1998: 135). 
Thus, securitisation of an issue occurs when this issue is presented as 
posing an existential threat (i.e. a threat to survival) to a designated referent object. 
The handling of this existential threat requires emergency measures and 
extraordinary means, and justifies actions outside the normal political procedure 
(Buzan et al., 1998: 23_24).44 Similarly, Cawthra (1997) asserts that issues should 
not be labelled as security threats unless there is no other way of dealing with 
them. A threat poses a high possibility of severe disruption to the normal processes 
of government and society within a relatively short time. 
Furthermore, Buzan et al. (1998: 24--25, 31) stress another feature of the 
concept of security and that is its inter-subjective character, meaning that 
securitising actors (i.e. actors who securitise issues by declaring something 
existentially threatened)45 do not decide whether an issue is securitised, but this is 
decided when the 'audience' accepts it as such. In other words, security is 
ultimately constructed inter-subjectively between securitising agents and the 
\ 
audience. Consequently, to securitise or to accept a securitisation is alwflYs a 
43 Referent objects are 'things' that are seen to be existentially threatened and that have a 
legitimate claim to survival (Buzan et at., 1998: 36). 
44 Extraordinary measures and actions outside the normal bounds of political procedure 
separate a securitised issue from a politicised one. When an issue is politicised it is part of a 
public policy, requiring a government's decision and resource allocation (Buzan et at., 1998: 23) 
and as such falls within the framework of normal politics. Thus, an issue is politicised when it is 
perceived as a mere problem ana securitised when it is perceived as a threat. 
45 Securitising actors can thus be states' leaders, different -groups within civil society, 
international governmental and non-governmental organisations, ethnic and religious leaders, and 
the like. 
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political choice; this choice, however, has to be made within socially defined 
limits as to what can and cannot be securitised (Buzan et al., 1998: 29, 39).46 
4.2. New Security Thinking and the Concept of a Security Community 
In the past, the political choices regarding the securitisation of issues in 
African states were made by elites in power at the expense of the security of the 
citizens. These choices were backed by their Cold War allies, and although the 
backing was considerably reduced after the Cold War, many regimes or their 
successors continued endangering the security of the populace. Here, two 
questions arise: how the tension between state/regime security on the one hand, 
and human and communal security on the"-other can be resolved; and how the 
concept of a security community understood in terms of the absence of military 
threats can be reconciled with the new security threats and the reality of African 
states, SADC member states in particular. 
On the first question: if human beings are put at the centre of everything we 
do, as suggested by the Secretary General of the UN, Kofi Annan, in ~is Millenium 
Report (Annan, 2000), this would clearly require that the concept of sequrity 
becomes people-centric. This is relevant especially in cases where states, or better 
yet regimes in power, which are meant to play the role of a neutral agency and are 
considered to be the only legitimate entity for ensuring the security of the citizens, 
pursue their own security at the expense of the security of the majority of citizens, 
46 The perception of the apartheid regime in South Africa of what represented threats to its 
security can illustrate Buzan's point. The regime listed leftist activities, exaggerated humanism, 
permissiveness, materialism and related ideologies, black racism, exaggerated individual 
freedom, one-man-one-vote, boycotts, demonstrations, undermining activities, and so on as 
yosing threats to its security (Zacarias, 1999: 99). It can be argued that the audience,-South 
Africans, rejected such a definition, except for most of the ruling (white) minority. It is also clear 
that this perception of threats was. politically conditioned and ideologically motivated. 
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and hence represent a source of threats to human security. In this case, the problem 
arises as to who is ultimately going to ensure the security of people. 
The implementation of this task cannot be left to more or less organised 
groups of people because this could result in a situation where different groups of 
combatants take the provision of 'security' into their own hands, as already 
demonstrated by the events in some African countries, such as the Democratic 
Republic of Congo (DRC) , Somalia, or Liberia. The other possible solution is a 
more prominent role of international institutions, dealing with security as well as 
development issues. At present, this solution does not seem plausible since many 
developed countries (especially the US) as the most capable financial and material 
supporters of the UN peace and security related activities have adopted a 'hands 
off approach when it comes to addressing the most acute African security 
problems. 
If we take the position that the ongomg processes of state-making and 
nation-building in many African countries are the main causes of different 
insecurities, it seems that the final solution to the paradox of the state lies in the 
process of national integration with the consequent establishment of an 
\ 
amalgamated security community which would eliminate or 'reconcile' the tepsion 
between regime and human security. 
On the second question: since there is a consensus emerging within the 
academic community that threats to the security of African states are mostly non-
military in nature, Deutsch's definition of a security community needs to be 
adapted to the conditions in African states. Thus, a security community is here 
defined as a community which has managed to eliminate the existential threats 
related to large-scale violence and political instability (e.g. war, political violence, 
a regime's oppression of a population) and at least minimise existential threats 
related to the general wellbeing of the population (HIV/AIDS, poverty, cnme, 
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drug trafficking, soil-erosion, and the like). The latter are included in this broader 
definition of a security community because they frequently contribute to the 
causes of internal conflicts or pose existential threats to a large part of the 
population. If they are not at least minimised, they will continue preventing the 
establishment of a security community within as well as between the states. Since 
these threats are related to the economic and social conditions of African states, 
the process of development becomes instrumental in the establishment of security 
communities on the African continent. 
In terms of the above definition of a security community, development is 
understood firstly, as a process aimed at significantly reducing or eliminating the 
existential threats to referent objects; and secondly, in terms of human 
development, which is the development of people, for the people and by the 
people (UNDP, 2000). Therefore, development is aimed at increasing the 
availability and widening of the distribution of basic life-sustaining goods, raising 
the standards of living, and expanding the range of economic and social choices 
available to individuals and states (Van Wyk, 2000). Development as an end is 
aimed at achieving "freedom from fear" and "freedom from want" (Annan, 2000) 
\ 
as two basic conditions for a decent standard of living. At the same time, frerdom 
from fear and freedom from want r.epresent the main pillars of a security 
community as defined above. 
4.3. (Regional) Security Complex 
Another important characteristic of the security problematic of African 
states is that threats result!!lg from an extensive variety of deprivations (such as 
_. famine, disease, and deadly epidemics) are also transnational in nature (Kaco\vicz, 
1997: 373). They are sometimes aggravated by internal conflicts with a tendency 
~ -- c 
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to spill over into neighbouring states. Hence, certain security issues are shared by 
several states in a region and cannot be resolved by individual states alone. In such 
cases, the interrelated concepts of regional/transnational security complex and 
regionalismlregionalisation become relevant. 
In relation to the mutual concerns linked to the security problematic, Buzan 
et at. (1998: 12) introduce the concept of a security complex,47 defined as " ... a set 
of states whose maj or security perceptions and concerns are so interlinked that 
their national security problems cannot reasonably be analysed or resolved apart 
from one another." They further argue that the dynamics and structure ofa security 
complex are usually generated by the units within it, by their security perceptions 
of, and interactions with, each other. Thus, security complexes are products of the 
increasing regionalisation in different security sectors at various levels. They may 
also occur as a result of the collective securitisation of pressures arising from the 
operation of larger systems, such as the global environment or the global 
economy. Security complexes are theoretical constructs, but they also reflect 
observable patterns of global politics and cannot be constructed haphazardly 
(Buzan et at., 1998: 14,201). 
~ 
Buzan et at. (1998: 12) also assert that the internal dynamics of a regional 
.I 
security complex can be located along a spectrum according to whether the 
security interdependence is motivated by amity or enmity. At the negative end of 
the spectrum lies conflict formation, in which interdependence arises from fear, 
rivalry, and the mutual perception of threat. In the middle of this spectrum lies a 
security regime,48 in which the interests of states are neither wholly compatible nor 
47 Buzan et al. (1998: 201) also introduce the concept of a security constellation, which is a 
much wider concept than secunty complex, and it encompasses the totality of possible security 
_ interrelationships at all levels. 
48 Acharya (1994: 86) defines a security regime as a formal or informal arrangement whose 
main objective is to significantly reduce, if not eltminate, the likelihood of war by securing 
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wholly competitive, and where it is possible to assure compliance with a set of 
principles, rules and norms (Acharya, 1994: 89) to deal with the security 
dilemma49 among states. At the positive end of the spectrum lies a pluralistic 
security community in Deutsch's sense. The regional integration of states in a 
sense of the establishment of a pluralistic security community will eliminate the 
regional security complex (Buzan et at., 1998: 12). Based on this explanation, we 
can conclude that Buzan's understanding of a security complex relates mainly to 
military threats. However, states can also be interdependent as regards the security 
problematic in the economic, political, social and environmental sectors. 
This interdependence of the security problematic, which IS also 
characteristic for the SADC region, compels SADC member states to co-ordinate 
their efforts when dealing with transnational and other threats to their security, 
also in the context of their integration process. In the next chapter, some of the 
issues found in military, political, economic, societal and environmental security 
sectors, which can be perceived as threats to the security of SADC member states, 
will be analysed. 
,I 
adherence to a set of nonns and rules that restrain the conflictual behaviour of regional actors in 
relation to one another. In the case of African states, this security regime would have to deal with 
other threats to security at the state, regional, communal or individual level, arising from the 
political, social, economic and environmental sectors. 
49 In the early 1950s, Herz(Solomon, 1998) introduced the term 'security dilemma', defined 
as a structural notion in which the self-help attempts of states to -look after their security needs 
tend, regardless of their intentions, to lead to rising insecurity for others as each interprets its own 
measures as defensive, and the llleasures of others as potentially threatening. 
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5. THE SECTORAL BREAKDOWN OF THE SECURITY 
PROBLEMATIC IN THE SADC REGION 
The SADC region has a security problematic relatively similar to other 
parts of the African continent. Venter (1996: 164) summarises these similarities by 
pointing out that, firstly, all major threats to the security of the region derive from 
internal rather than external factors, with some countries having domestic crises 
with a potential to spill over into neighbouring states. Secondly, the most serious 
security threats are political, economic, social and environmental in nature rather 
than military. Finally, certain issues are transnational in nature: refugees, illegal 
immigrants, environmental degradation, the depletion of and competition for 
scarce natural resources, the proliferation of small arms, and drug smuggling, 
among others. 
Despite the complexity of the security problematic, many Southern African 
countries are still preoccupied with mostly military and political security issues. 
For example, the defence and security white paper, adopted by the Mozambican 
government in 1997, sets goals for the defence and security agencies\ which cover 
the military and political sectors.50 ,I 
As opposed to this understanding, South Africa's security concept, which 
was included in its White Paper on National Defence (Defence in a Democracy, 
May 1996), is in line with the new approaches to security, and the people-centric 
approach in particular. National security is not viewed as a predominantly military 
50 The goals are the following: to guarantee the independence, sovereignty and territorial 
integrity of the country; to defend and consolidate national unity; to defend and ensure the normal 
functioning of democratic institutions; to safeguard the internal and external security of the state; 
to ensure the fundamental rights and liberties of citizens; and to maintain law and public order 
(Chachiua, 2000). 
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and/or police problem; it is broadened to incorporate political, economic, social 
and environmental issues. The South African government has recognised that the 
biggest threats to its people are socio-economic: poverty, unemployment, poor 
education, the lack of housing and the absence of adequate social services, as well 
as high levels of crime and violence. 
Therefore, the issue of what represents the security problematic in the 
SADC region can be a subject of contention, since different securitising agents 
stress different aspects of security. In the following section, selected issues from 
different security sectors, which were or can potentially be securitised, are 
examined in more details to demonstrate the complexity of the security 
problematic of SADC member states. 
5.1. The Military Sector 
The military sector covers relationships of forceful coercion, and military 
security concerns the traditional or realist preoccupations with armed offensive 
and defensive capabilities of states and states' perception of these capabilities and 
~ 
of each other's intentions (Buzan et at., 1998: 7-8). Therefore, the threats in the , 
military sector arise mainly at the state level, but can be found also at the 
communal level in 'anarchical states'. 
As already noted, one of the features of many African states is the fact that 
they tum the Hobbesian anarchy, characteristic for the international system, inside 
out. Consequently, African states have been able to maintain negative peace 
(understood as the absence of war or conflict) among themselves, and external 
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military threats have not represented a security issue. 51 Still, even in the absence of 
external military threats, the military has played an important role in African 
societies. 
The military has been crucial in maintaining the security of a regime in the 
face of numerous armed and civilian opposition groups. The history of South 
Africa during apartheid and Mozambique during the civil war illustrate this, as do 
the current situations in Angola and the DRC. 
In some cases, the military has staged coups d'etat to take over the 
government. In the SADC region, Lesotho experienced such military rule when 
the authoritarian government of Chief Jonathan was overthrown by the military in 
1986 (Booth and Vale, 1995: 319). 
Related to the issue of military threats is the problem of arms proliferation. 
One of the major factors that has contributed to the high levels of violence and 
conflict in African countries is the transfer of weapons and weapons technology 
from the industrialised countries. Sophisticated weapons acquired at great cost to 
provide security can often increase the prospects of conflict and add to the 
insecurity of African states (Ayoob, 1991: 274). 
, 
However, arms do not come only from developed countries. The SADC 
I 
region has its own supplier - South Afr!ca. Increasingly, the region is said to be an 
important market for the South Africa's armament industry, but the export of arms 
51 Although inter-state conflicts were not on the agenda, the (c)overt support of African states 
for rebel, liberation or other movements in neighbouring states can be considered as hostile and 
representing a (military/political) threat. The examples are numerous; during the Cold War, the 
Zairian president Mobutu and South Africa supported the National Union for the Total 
Independence of Angola (UNITA) fighting the Angolan government, the Front Line States (FLS) 
supported the African National Congress (ANC) against the apartheid regime, Malawi assisted 
the Mozambican National Resistance (RENAMO) until 1986, Zambia and Angola backed the 
_ South West Africa People's Organisation (SW APO), and so on. This practice continued after the 
Cold War with Angola supporting Kabila's rebellion against Mobutu in the DRC, and Rwanda 
and Uganda as preponderant regional powers supportip.g rebel groups in the DRC. 
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to the region provides further means for increased insecurity in the region and the 
means for its inhabitants to kill one another. In this case, the desire for 
disarmament is overshadowed by South Africa's goal of generating jobs in the 
country with high levels of unemployment, and developing other sectors of the 
economy (Booth and Vale, 1995: 309). 
5.2. The Political Sector 
The political sector is about relationships of authority, governing status and 
recognition; and political security concerns the organisational stability of states, 
systems of government and the ideologies giving them legitimacy (Buzan et at., 
1998: 7-8). Here, the tension between regiine and human/communal security is 
most evident. 
Threats to political security in African states come mainly from within their 
borders. Political systems in many African states generate and perpetuate 
autocratic practices embodied in a minority regime, which manipulates the 
apparatus of the state in a discriminatory and arbitrary manner that furthers the 
\ 
interests of the minority. This situation does not improve considerably quring 
democratic transitions (see section 5.4.), which are currently taking place all over 
the African continent. 
As a result, regimes in power face challenges from domestic opposition in 
the form of demonstrations, riots, strikes and even armed resistance. 
Consequently, such regimes generate oppressive and repressive violence, which 
endangers the security of excluded populations or those advocating alternative 
policies (Fall, 1993: 76). Ihis situation is not only perpetuated by the regimes in 
power; the whole administration is geared towards strengthening the security of a 
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regime. Citizens consider such regimes as illegitimate and the same is true for the 
ideology sustaining them (Fall, 1993: 76). 
South Africa during apartheid provided a good example of an illegitimate 
regime since the ruling regime was racially exclusive and thus based on minority 
rule. The regime security was maintained at the expense of the security of the 
majority of South Africans. Consequently, for South Africa's majority, the 
insecurity of the Pretoria government and its apartheid regime represented the 
hope of improved security, a security to be achieved by a non-racial and 
democratic political system (Booth and Vale, 1995: 307). 
In addition, the political instability caused by domestic strife in South 
Africa and the impact of destabilisation on South Africa's neighbours was a threat 
to the regimes in the region (Zacarias, 199~; 112). With the exception of Angola, 
where South Africa became involved in the civil war backing UNIT A, South 
African armed forces adopted a practice of supporting insurgent groups in 
Mozambique and Angola and striking at suspected ANC and SW APO camps and 
facilities throughout Southern Africa. This had destabilising effects in targeted 
countries (Angola, Botswana, Lesotho, Mozambique, Swaziland, Zambia and 
Zimbabwe) and the entire Southern African region (Sullivan, 1989: 263). 
1 
Additional examples of regime insecurity are regimes currently in place in 
Lesotho and Swaziland, which are increasingly challenged by the opposition 
pressures to (further) democratise their political systems. The presence of the 
democratic South Africa in the neighbourhood can additionally contribute to this 
insecurity (Booth and Vale, 1995: 319). 
The challenges to regional interstate borders represent another threat to 
political security and could destabilise the SADC region. In early 1994, Namibia 
was finally consolidated into a single unit when Walvis Bay, formerly a part of 
- South Africa, became part of the country. This has set a precedent on the basis of 
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which other states around South Africa have laid claims to South Africa's territory: 
Lesotho claims the territories in the eastern Free State province, Swaziland areas 
of Mpumalanga. Other border disputes in the region include the dispute between 
Tanzania and Malawi over the boundary in Lake Malawi, and Namibia's claim to 
Sidudu/Kasakili Island in the Okavango/Chobe river on the Botswana border 
(Booth and Vale, 1995: 318; Venter, 1996: 163). The latter dispute was resolved 
by the International Court of Justice in 1999 (CIA, 2000). However, since 1997, 
two other islands have been in dispute between these two countries, Setungo and 
Luyondo, also in the Okavango/Chobe river (Africa South of the Sahara, 1999: 
777). 
Moreover, the borders of SADC members are not challenged only from 
outside, but also from within by various secessionist movements. For instance, the 
Front for Liberation of the Cabinda Enclave (FLEC) is fighting for the 
independence of Cabinda from Angola; and the Caprivi Liberation Movement 
(CLM) wants to ensure the secession of the Caprivi strip from Namibia (Africa 
South of the Sahara, 1999: 159, 778). 
5.3. The Economic Sector 
The relationships of trade, production, and finance are the essence of the 
economic sector; and economic security is about access to the resources, finance 
and markets necessary to sustain acceptable levels of welfare and state power 
(Buzan et at., 1998: 7-8). The threats to security in this sector arise at the state as 
well as the individual level. 
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Underdevelopment,52 which is a prevalent condition in African countries, 
has considerably contributed to the instability in these countries, and has been 
aggravated by a hostile international economic environment (for selected 
developmental indicators see Table 1). The first factor that leads to instability is 
the disparity among regions. Disparities in regional development result from 
differences in economic resource endowment, and varied levels of development 
and modernisation as well as imbalances in such sectors as employment, 
education, health and infrastructure. These economic imbalances amongst regions 
have been, if not created, at least sustained and strengthened by clientelism, and 
have been the cause of frustration in the poor regions. On the other hand, regions 
well endowed with natural resources oppose the exploitation of these resources for 
the benefit of the whole population, or rather consider that a region's economic 
superiority must be reflected in the position of the inhabitants of this region in the 
domestic political arena (Fall, 1993: 82). 
One can find an example of such regional disparities in Mozambique. Its 
economy was not geographically integrated and there were no major roads or 
corridors linking the hinterland with the coastline from east to west, or functional 
\ 
roads between its southern and northern borders. Southern Mozambique, had 
strong connections with the developm~nt of South Africa's economy and, as a 
52 According to Human Development Report for 2000 (UNDP, 2000), SADC member states 
have not ranked high in the Human Development Index (HDI). HDI measures the average 
achievements in a country in three basic dimensions of human development: a long and healthy 
life (life expectancy at birth), knowledge (adult literacy and combined gross primary, secondary 
and tertiary enrolment ratio), and a decent standard ofliving (Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per 
capita - purchasing power parity in US dollars). Out of 174 countries surveyed in 2000, 
Seychelles ranked 53, Mauritius-71, South Africa 103, Swaziland 112, Namibia 115, Botswana 
122, Lesotho 127, Zimbabwe 130 as the countries with medium human development, and the 
DRC 152, Zambia 153, Tanzania 156, Angola 160, Malawi 163 and Mozambique 168 as the 
countries with low human development. 
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TABLE 1: DEVELOPMENT INDICATORS 
Life Expectancy at 
Population with Access to Social Infrastructure in 1994-
GDP per capita in Adult Illiteracy in 1995 (%) Country 1998 (US$) Birth in 1997 1995 (%) (Years) Sanitation Safe Water Health Services 
Angola 427 48 47 16 32 n.a. 
Botswana 3 175 51 30 55 70 n.a. 
DRC r 119 54 23 18 25 26 \ 
Lesotho 396 59 29 38 57 80 
Malawi 156 41 44 63 54 35 
Mauritius 3664 72 17 100 100 100 
Mozambique 134 48 60 54 28 39 
Namibia 1 865 56 56 
,:' 
34 57 59 
Seychelles 7087* n.a. 72 92 97 n.a. 
South Africa 2819 66 18 53 70 n.a. 
Swaziland 1203 61 23 70 60 n.a. ",}' 
Tanzania 256 52 32 86 49 42 
Zambia 409 44 22 64 59 n.a. 
Zimbabwe 565 49 15 58 74 85 
* data is for 1997 
n.a. - data is not available 
Sources: African Development Bank (1999) African Human Development Report 1999. Oxford: Oxford University Press for African 
Development Bank. ... 
SADe (2000) The Official SADC Trade, Industry and Investment Review 2000. Southern African Marketing Co. (Pty) Ltd. and SADC. 
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result, is the most developed area in Mozambique (Lundin, 2000).53 Similarly, 
Zambia's economy is dominated by a core area along the rail line from Livingstone 
to the Copperbelt, where most of the economic activity is focused (Rule, 1996: 
364). 
The inequitable distribution of resources within as well as between the 
countries in the SADC region is producing and strengthening asymmetries within 
the region. While South Africa's economy is two and a half times larger than the 
rest of SADC economies taken together, the gap between South Africa and the 
weakest economies of Malawi, Mozambique and Tanzania is even larger. These 
economic asymmetries have a twofold impact. They can increase fears of 
domination by strong economies on weaker economies, 54 and they can encourage 
the emergence of economic refugees (Zacarias, 1999: 114-115). 
States of immigration feel threatened by this phenomenon, since refugees 
add to the already existing socio-political strain. South Africa has attracted 
immigrants from countries such as Mozambique, Lesotho, Zimbabwe, Angola, and 
the DRC, to name just the countries from the SADC region, especially after the 
transition to majority rule. Economic refugees are believed to engage in criminal 
\ 
activities (arms smuggling, for example), to aggravate the high rates of 
" 
unemployment, and to represent a drain on already stretched social services.55 
53 About 47 percent of Mozambican manufacturers are located in and around'Maputo, 
although the government is encouraging decentralisation towards Beira and northern 
Mozambique (Africa South of the Sahara, 1999: 759). 
54 For instance, South Africa is being accused of flooding neighbouring markets with its 
products and destroying local manufacturers while closing its market to their exports by way of 
high tariffs and other barriers. However, South Africa's neighbours generally cannot provide the 
products that constitute the bulk of its imports on the one hand, and on the other, South Africa 
produces itself many of the agricultural and mining commodities that other SADC member states 
can supply (Leistner, 1997: 119) 
55 In 1994, it was estimated that 5 million illegal immigrants cost South Africa 1.985 million 
rands (Solomon and Cilliers, 1..99.,?). 
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These beliefs may encourage xenophobia and lead to domestic unrest (Cawthra, 
1997; Ryan-Sinclair, 1998: 339,345). 
In addition, international experience shows that when cross-border 
migration develops, new transnational issues surface. These include drug 
smuggling and the proliferation of small arms, which are also major elements ina 
new subculture of "border-economies" in Southern Africa (Booth and Vale, 1995: 
307). 
The economic problems in many African countries thus lead to a situation 
in which large numbers of people are deprived of their resource base and capacity 
for self-reliance. As a result of poor economic performance, some of the 
economies are unable to provide for the basic needs (food and health) of their 
people. 56 With high levels of unemployment57 the chances of criminal activity 
increase (Zacarias, 1999: 113). 
The end of the civil war in Mozambique put the issue of the integration of 
former soldiers into the society on the agenda. The lack of employment 
opportunities coupled with the inability of small-scale agriculture to guarantee the 
subsistence of rural families forced former combatants to use anything at their 
\ 
disposal for survival, including weapons. Together with unsettled refufees, 
displaced people and unemployed youth, they represent recruits for criminal 
groups and thus crime has become a way of life for many people. However, the 
56 The available data on the popUlation living below poverty line for selected SADC member 
states are as follows: 47 percent in Botswana (1997), 49.2 in Lesotho (1993), 54 in Malawi 
(1991), 10.6 in Mauritius (1992), 57 in South Africa (1996), 51.1 in Tanzania (1991), 86 in 
Zambia (1993) and 60 in Zimbabwe (1999) (figures are estimates only) (ClA, 2000; The 
Economist, February 24 - March 2, 2001). 
57 The estimated unemployment rates for different SADC states are as follows: more than 50 
percent in Angola (1999), 2cr-40 in Botswana (1999), more than 50 in Lesotho (1999) 
(unemployed and underemployed), 2 in Mauritius (1996), 30-40 in Namibia (1997) (unemployed 
and underemployed), 30 in South Africa (1999), 22 in Swaziland (1995), 25 in Zambia (1998) 
and 50 in Zimbabwe (1999) (ClAz-2000). 
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inability of the police to fight cnme represents a risk that law-breaking will 
become a rule, resulting in a culture of lawlessness in Mozambique (Chachiua, 
2000), thus producing a permanent threat to the security of ordinary citizens. 
In cases where the state has failed to ensure the economic security of its 
citizens, they must depend on international humanitarian assistance for their 
survival. This assistance, while crucial in saving lives, may also have the effect of 
encouraging dependency and undermining development. This, in tum, reinforces 
poverty, underdevelopment, the competition for scarce resources, the conflict over 
state power and the control over resources and distributive system (Deng, 1996: 
219), and perpetuates threats to economic security. 
Another issue that can be singled out in relation to economic security is the 
problem of the economic viability of the so-called 'pocket states'. Lesotho and 
Swaziland are small landlocked countries with few natural resources. Both 
countries are poverty-stricken and provide a labour reserve for a dominant regional 
economy - South Africa. Lesotho depends on four major sources of capital 
formation: migrant remittances, dividends from the Southern African Customs 
Union (SACU), foreign aid, and the export of water through the Lesotho 
Highlands Water Project. Swaziland depends on the sugar and timbei industries as 
, 
the main foreign exchange earners. Both economies rely on South Africa for 
employment, trade, supplies of subsistence goods and various other commodities 
(Matlosa, 1998: 324-325). Thus, any major disruption in the economic ties with 
South Africa would have implications for the economic security of both states. 
5.4. The Societal Sector 
The societal sector concerns itself with the relationships of collective 
identity. Consequently, societal security relates to the sustainability and evolution 
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of traditional patterns of language, culture, religious and national identity and 
custom (Buzan et at., 1998: 7-8). Therefore, communal security is mostly 
associated with this sector. 
As noted, one of the major projects of African statesmen after 
independence was nation-building, i.e. the fusing into one nation of a multitude of 
ethnic communities often separated by arbitrary colonial borders. However, ethnic 
and other group identities proved too strong to be abolished or replaced by one 
'national' identity. As a result, the state apparatus and political power was hijacked 
by minority groups motivated by strong ethnic and at times religious sentiments, 
which has led to the identification of power with the dominant ethnic group, with 
marginalised ethnic groups developing an anti-establishment attitude (Fall, 1993: 
79). Even in countries where political syste]Jls were initially based on the support 
of several ethnic groups, the ethnic basis of regimes have eventually shrunk. 
In Zambia, for example, Kaunda gained power after independence with 
broad multi-ethnic support. Of around six major ethnic groups, only the Ila and 
Tonga supported the opposition. However, this broad support of the ruling party 
soon contracted and Kaunda declared a single-party state to disguise the narrow 
(ethnic) base of his party, confined by then largely to the Nyanja oft~e east. Their 
! 
support of Kaunda was clearly demonstrated in the 1991 election when Kaunda's 
party won all the seats in the Eastern Province, where the Nyanja represent the 
majority of population (Horowitz, 1993: 26; Rule, 1996: 372-373). 
The grievances of other (excluded) ethnic groups brought about a major 
victory of Chiluba's Movement for Multiparty Democracy (MMD), an interethnic 
opposition group. The Chiluba regime, however, was repeating the process of 
exclusion that narrowed the base of his predecessor. In March 1995, increasing 
divisions became evident -within the MMD between the Bemba to which Chiluba 
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belongs and the Nsenga (Africa South of the Sahara, 1999: 1163; Horowitz, 1993: 
26). 
The prevalence of ethnic affiliations in politics is characteristic of many 
African countries. This calls the transitions to democratic political systems as 
promoted by Western states into question. 58 These democratic transitions are seen 
as a panacea for resolving many problems preoccupying African states, including 
the problem of ethnic divisions and tensions. Although multiparty elections have 
been taking place in SADC member states, ethnic divisions and ethnic alliances 
remain an important ingredient of multiparty politics. 59 
Malawi's multiparty elections of 1994 have shown that the three political 
parties that emerged as serious contenders in the run-up to the elections (the 
Malawi Congress Party (MCP), the Unite~d Democratic Front (UDF) and the 
Alliance for Democracy (AFORD)) drew their support from a regional platform, 
but this 'regionalism' was a product of the ethnic composition of the country. The 
MCP drew its support from the Central Region, populated mostly by the Chewa. 
58 As asserted by Rustow (1970: 354): "a country is likely to attain democracy not by 
copying the constitutional laws or parliamentary practices of some previous demoFacy, but rather 
by honestly facing up to its particular conflicts and by devising or adapting effective procedures 
for their accommodation." His argument is supported by Berger and Lukman's (1967: 51--55, 59-
61) theory of institutionalisation, according to .which social order is a product of human activity in 
the past. Institutions imply historicity, i.e. they always have a history of which they are a product 
and cannot be created instantaneously. To persist in time, these institutions have to be transmitted 
to a new generation as 'objective reality'. In the case of political institutions and activities, this 
would imply that 'objective reality' is transmitted by way of political socialisation. Therefore, the 
transmission of political reality from generation to generation is characteristic of all societies, but 
such transmission from society to society can prove problematic, extremely difficult or, in some 
cases, even impossible, because 'objective (political) realities' of two different societies might not 
be reconcilable. 
59 It seems that Rustow (1970) is correct in arguing that 'national unity' as a single 
background condition must precede all other phases of the democratisation process, which are: 
the preparatory or conflict phase, the decision or institutionalisation phase, and the habituation 
phase. National unity must also persist throughout all these phases_as regional or ethnic divisions 
- can result in the situation of latent or manifest secession if they are not crosscut by class or other 
cleavages. 
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The UDF gained its votes from the south dominated by the Yao, and AFORD from 
the Northern Region mainly populated by the Tumbuka. Similar patterns were 
observed in the 1999 elections, although religious factor also played a part 
(Thorold, 2000: 136-138). With such ethnic divisions, recent pre-byelection 
violence between supporters of the ruling UDF and the main opposition party - the 
MCP - is not surprising (Allafrica.com, 9.4.2001). 
Violence frequently accompanies the election process III Africa. For 
instance, during the 1999 election campaign in Namibia, there were numerous 
cases reported of SW APO supporters60 using violence to intimidate opposition 
candidates and supporters (Glover, 2000: 146-147). 
In general, voting along ethnic lines and politics based on ethnic allegiances 
do not represent problems in themselves, but they become problematic if ethnic 
identities are securitised when they are perceived as threatened. Although ethnic 
conflicts and tensions are frequent in African politics, the experience of ethnically 
homogenous countries, such as Lesotho, suggests that the fundamental causes of 
internal conflicts in Africa transcend ethnicity and ethnic competition (Kokole, 
1996: 128). Ethnic or religious overtones that many political and social conflicts in 
\ 
Africa take are only a fa9ade for the much more complex social and political 
.I 
situations of injustice, inequality and d~mination. The ethnic factor appears to be a 
framework for social recourse and mobilisation aimed at finding a solution to a 
problem (Fall, 1993: 80-81). 
In relation to this, Bayart (1993: 55) asserts that in the context of 
contemporary African states ethnicity exists mainly as an agent of accumulation, 
both of wealth and of political power. Manifestations of ethnicity can be perceived 
less as a political force in itself than as a channel through which competition for 
60 SW APO mainly draws its support from the former Ovamboland (Ohangwena, Omusati, 
Oshana and Oshikoto regionsHGlover, 2000: 143). 
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the acquisition of wealth, power or status is expressed. Ethnicity is asserted when 
it is useful to a group in securing an advantage or resisting deprivation (Turner, 
1997: 9). 
Since in many African countries, including SADC member states, resources 
are scarce, but more available in the sector of public administration, the struggle 
for power becomes a struggle for wealth (Bayart, 1993: 87, 89). In times of 
economic hardship, when the struggle for scarce resources intensifies, people tend 
to organise themselves into ever-smaller groups to compete more successfully for 
access to resources (Solomon and Cilliers, 1996). 
Thus, the securitisation of ethnicity does not necessarily mean that a 
particular ethnic group itself is threatened, rather that the security of people is 
threatened by factors arising from other (non-societal) security sectors, economic 
or environmental, for example. Ethnic or religious leaders as securitising agents 
can interpret or 'rationalise' these threats in ethnic or religious terms and use 
ethnicity or a religious group as the main object of security. 
For instance, on account of economic grievances, RENAMO managed to 
secure its support largely from the Ndau ethnic group from central Mozambique 
and has stood against the government dominated by Southerners, wbo are better 
I 
off in terms of wealth and education compared to their Ndau counterparts 
(Solomon and Cilliers, 1996). 
The ethnic element is basically exploited in most SADC member states for 
various reasons: in Angola's civil war where Savimbi portrays himself as the 
leader of the Umbundu, who are allegedly marginalised by the government, 
supported by the Kimbundu and mesticoes; in South Africa, where Zulu 
nationalism has resulted in thousands of lives being lost; in Malawi, where, as 
noted, parties organise themselves along regional and ethnic lines, and. so on 
(Solomon and Cilliers, 1996). 
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5.5. The Environmental Sector 
The environmental sector is about relationships between human activity and 
the planetary biosphere. Environmental security concerns the maintenance of the 
local and planetary biosphere as the essential support system on which other 
human enterprises depend (Buzan et at., 1998: 7_8).61 
The environment represents a source of threats to SADC members since it 
can generate conflict, especially in states where natural resources provide the main 
source of wealth and subsistence for citizens. All natural resources are potential 
sources of conflict, especially when they entail access to oil and mineral wealth. It 
is often stated that minerals are a root cause of conflict, and that they finance the 
conflicts in the DRC and Angola. The income derived from the minerals is used to 
extend the fighting capacity of the combatants, thus prolonging instability, conflict 
and human suffering (Selebi, 1999: 10). 
TABLE 2: ENVIRONMENT 
Percentage 
Country of Arable Land Environmental issues 
in 1991 \ 
Soil erosion on account of population pr~sures, 
Angola 3 desertification, deforestation of the tropical rain forest, 
inadequate supplies of potable water 
Botswana 2 Periodic droughts, overgrazing, desertification, limited fresh water resources 
TheDRC 3 Droughts in the south, water pollution, deforestation 
Lesotho 11 Overgrazing resulting from population pressures, severe 
soil erosion and exhaustion, desertification 
Malawi 18 Deforestation, soil degradation, water pollution 
Mauritius 52 Water pollution 
Recurrent droughts, migration of the population to urban 
Mozambique 4 and coastal areas has environmental consequences, 
-- desertification, pollution of surface and coastal waters 
61 For the environmental issues facing individual SADC member states, see Table 2. 
68 
Percentage 
Country of Arable Land Environmental issues 
in 1991 
Namibia 1 Droughts, limited fresh water resources, desertification 
Seychelles 2 Water supply depends on catchments for rain water 
South Africa 11 Lack of water resources, pollution of rivers, air pollution (acid rain), soil erosion, desertification 
Swaziland 12 Limited supplies of potable water, overgrazmg, soil degradation and erosion 
Tanzania 4 Soil degradation, deforestation, droughts 
Zambia 7 Air pollution (acid rain), deforestation, soil erosion, desertification, lack of adequate water treatment 
Zimbabwe 7 Deforestation, soil erosion and degradation, air and water pollution 
Sources: Solomon, Hussein and Cilliers, Jakkie (1996) "Sources of Southern African Insecurity 
and the Quest for Regional Integration". People, Poverty and Peace (Monograph No.4). 
[on line] http://www.iss.co.zalPubsIMONOGRAPHSINO%204/Sol%20+%20Ci11.html 
CIA (2000) The World Factbook 2000. [on fine] 
http://www.cia.gov/ciaipublications/factbook 
Another environmental condition causing problems in the SADC region is 
environmental scarcity.62 Scarcity of arable land is one such problem in the SADC 
region (see Table 2). African soil is often poor and not fertile enough fO sustain the 
population. Botswana and Lesotho, for example, are not very suitable for 
agricultural production. In other parts Df the SADC region, droughts and floods 
often affect food production. A problem related to the scarcity of arable land is the 
unequal distribution of this land (Van Wyk, 2000), which can result in political 
instability, as the situation related to the redistribution of the land owned by white 
farmers in Zimbabwe demonstrates. 
62 There are three types of environmental scarcity: supply-induced scarcity, caused by 
degradation and depletion of environmental resources; demand-induced scarcity, which results 
from population growth or increased per capita consumption of a resource; and structural scarcity, 
which arises from an unequal social distribution of a resource (Percival and Homer-Dixon, 1998: 
280). 
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Scarcity of arable land is aggravated by soil degradation. According to 
research conducted by the Institute for Natural Resources in Africa (UNU/INRA, 
1999), the top causes of African soil degradation are overgrazing, inefficient 
agricultural activities, overexploitation, deforestation and vegetation removal. The 
research also finds that direct links existed between agricultural dependence and 
the fourteen African wars between 1989 and 1997. Agricultural decline results in 
migration as a survival strategy for Africa's rural poor, putting great pressures on 
the environment and natural resources of the new settlement areas and contributing 
to the growing urbanisation problems at the same time. Among sixteen African 
countries where soil degradation is the most acute, one can find Lesotho, Malawi, 
Mozambique, Swaziland, Tanzania and Zimbabwe, all SADC members. 
In addition, following a major world wide study on water resources, the UN 
published a report in 1996 which predicts that water is likely to be the source of 
major conflict in a number of water-scarce regions of the world, including 
Southern Africa around the Zambezi basin (Selebi, 1999: 10). 
The overall picture that defines the SADC region is that of water scarcity. 
At least three SADC member states - Botswana, Namibia and South Africa - are 
acutely short of water. Water is therefore now recognised as a \ fundamental 
.I 
political weapon in the region and it will increasingly shape the international 
relations and security arrangements of Southern Africa. Namibia's intention to 
drain water from the Okavango/Chobe river caused a diplomatic dispute between 
Namibia and Botswana. The disputes around the Okavango/Chobe water reserves 
are illustrative of the water problem in the SADC region (Van Wyk, 1998).63 
South Africa is trying to solve the problem of its water (in)security by 
'importing' water from Lesotho through the Lesotho Highlands Water Project. 
63 For more on water scarcity as a security issue, see Solomon (1996) .. 
- ~ ~-
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However, South Africa's plans to solve its water demands by obtaining supplies 
from the Zambezi river, which flows through eight other SADC member states, 
might cause a political confrontation. Malawi has a problem with its biggest river, 
the Shire, which supplies the state's hydro-electric power. The river is shrinking 
and may dry up as a result of falling water levels in Lake Malawi (Van Wyk, 
1998). 
Furthermore, the inability of the SADC region to deal with natural disasters 
such as droughts, floods and cyclones, which periodically affect agricultural 
production, contributes to the insecurity of people. In the process, natural disasters 
have damaged infrastructure and caused severe losses of food, cash crops and 
livestock (Zacarias, 1999: 113). 
* * * 
In this chapter, some of the issues that are or can be securitised in various 
security sectors of SADC member states have been analysed. Certain issues that 
might be considered relevant for the discussion in this chapter have been omitted 
because they can be linked to these sectors only indirectly, such as high levels of 
illiteracy, poor education, and HIV/AIDS. Since the HIV/AIDS 1pandemic is 
particularly acute on the African continent and especially in the Southern African 
countries, this issue has been securitised by African statesmen and by different 
regional and international governmental and non-governmental organisations. 
HIV I AIDS combined with other epidemics is endangering the lives of millions of 
Southern Africans, and therefore, it would be relevant to include the health sector 
in Buzan's sectoral classification of the security problematic, at least when 
describing the security problematic of African countries. In the next chapter, an 
attempt is made to analyse the factors preventing the establishment of security 
- communities in Southern Africa at the state as well as the regional level. 
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6. SADC AS A SECURITY COMMUNITY 
Various insecurities originating in military, political, economic, societal and 
environmental security sectors can forestall the national but also the supranational 
integration process of SADC members. For example, it is unlikely that a country 
dealing with domestic problems and insecurities arising on account of the absence 
of national integration and underdevelopment, and with limited resources for 
addressing them, would be committed to allocating resources, fully participating 
in, and taking advantage of the integration process at the regional level. 
This chapter attempts to analyse the situation in SADC member states 
against the background conditions conducive to disintegration as stipulated by 
Deutsch, and evaluate if and to what extent they are preventing the establishment 
of amalgamated security communities within SADC member states. Then, on the 
basis of the past and current attempts at integration, it tries to assess the prospects 
of SADC member states becoming a pluralistic security community. 
6.1. National (Dis)integration of SADC Member States 
Even though the previously disGussed military, political, social, economic 
and environmental issues might not be considered as threats individually but rather 
as problems, combined together they undoubtedly pose a great burden for SADC 
member states, especially since they are interrelated and mutually reinforcing. 
Consequently, there is no simple solution for addressing them. 
Any solution can prove difficult to find and implement, especially because 
African states are still struggling to develop into viable entities that would be able 
Jo compete with developed states on a more or less equal basis. Most states in the 
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SADC region can be characterised as weak,64 and some of them as quasi-states. 
They possess juridical statehood recognised by the international community, but 
their empirical statehood is weak, ill-functioning or even non-existent. Their 
physical bases, socio-political cohesion and institutions are affected either by 
colonial policies, internal disputes or other insecurities, or by regional instability. 
Furthermore, the SADC region shows vulnerabilities to both military and non-
military threats (Zacarias, 1999: 99). It seems that these problems have to be 
solved through the processes of nation-building, state-making and development. 
If the situation in SADC member states is assessed against the background 
conditions conducive to disintegration as posited by Deutsch and his colleagues 
(see section 2.1.5), the following conclusions as to why these states have largely 
failed in their tasks of state-making, and (to"'a certain extent) development, can be 
made. 
Firstly, after independence, SADC member states did not succeed in 
producing political loyalties directed towards the state; instead, the loyalties were 
directed towards different social groups within a particular state. In most Southern 
African states, state institutions have a limited geographical scope with state 
\ 
institutions being stronger in the capital and urban centres and weaker in the ,rural 
periphery or countryside. This situatio~ is linked with the problem of insufficient 
infrastructure. The lack of infrastructure (roads and railways, for example) 
obstructs communication between the urban centres and the countryside. 
In most SADC member states, the transport infrastructure was built by 
former colonial powers to facilitate the transportation of extracted resources for 
export rather than to connect the various parts of these countries. This was the case 
in Zambia, Namibia, Mozambique, Angola, the DRC, and Tanzania, to name some 
64 Buzan (1988: 28; Ayoob, 1991: 267) distinguishes between strong and weak states based 
on their socio-political cohesiv.eness. 
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of them. Furthermore, after independence, the existing and new transport 
infrastructure was poorly maintained due to lack of investment in this sector 
(Africa South of the Sahara, 1999).65 Consequently, it is not infrequent that sub-
state loyalties overcome state objectives, since the absence of the state allows for 
the development of local politics with objectives, values and priorities that can 
differ or even conflict with those of the state (Zacarias, 1999: 103). 
In countries characterised by civil war, the state is physically forced to 
withdraw from the countryside, since the infrastructure is destroyed and its 
officials are forced to abandon state functions. Subsequently, large areas are left 
behind without any state institutions to undertake basic political, economic and 
social functions (Zacarias, 1999: 105). Furthermore, the destruction of the 
transport infrastructure in a country can have regional consequences as the case of 
the Mozambican civil war demonstrates. This war affected regional trade, since 
the country provided an outlet for the Southern African landlocked countries 
(Africa South of the Sahara, 1999: 759). 
Secondly, except in a few countries such as Lesotho, national cohesion is 
inherently weak. The economic, cultural, social, and ethnic heterogeneity and 
\ 
differentiation of populations living in a particular state has not been matched by 
I 
the compensating integrative process of nation-building; the political elites in 
power rather used force for nation-building and/or for eliminating their opponents. 
Furthermore, the economic problems in such states can generate conflicts of 
solidarity and allegiance among the social groups, resulting from imbalances and 
65 Although South Africa has a relatively good transport infrastructure - the best in Africa (it 
has around one-third of all the railway track length in Sub-Saharan Africa, for example) - its 
transport network was almost exclusively designed to connect white cities and areas. The network 
of rural feeder roads is very poor, as are road and rail links with African townships and former 
'homelands'. The government is trying to improve this situation with new infrastructure projects, 
Known as the Spatial Development Initiatives (SDls), which are planned to have national as well 
as regional impact (Africa SouthQfthe Sahara, 1999: 1910; EIU, 2000a: 21). 
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disparities between regIons and communities (Fall, 1993: 82). The cases of 
regional imbalances in Mozambique and Zambia are already mentioned (see 
sections 5.3. and 5.4.), but the problem of regional imbalances is not limited only 
to these two countries.66 
Thirdly, after decolonisation, most of the 'democratic systems' in the SADC 
region, left behind by the departing colonial powers, gave way to either de jure or 
de facto one-party or one-man authoritarian regimes with the exception of 
Botswana and Mauritius. 67 After independence, the new regimes exploited control 
over the state for accumulation of personal wealth. Since the elites in SADC 
member states were relatively closed, and since there was a lack of opportunities 
to accumulate wealth by other means, their power was constantly challenged by 
counter-elites who wanted to use the state ~for their own enrichment (Diamond, 
1988: 1,21). Sometimes counter-elites managed to get control of part of the state's 
territory, often with important sources of wealth such as oil and different minerals, 
especially diamonds, as the civil wars in the DRC and Angola show. 
Although former authoritarian regimes gave way to multiparty politics and 
popular elections in the 1990s, which can be seen as a positive development, many 
\ 
current ruling parties control the majority of the seats in parliament. In such a 
.I 
situation, parliament as a fundamental institution of governance is generally weak, 
without a strong opposition (Africa News Online, 16.2.2000). This is the case in 
Angola, Lesotho, Namibia, Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe, although in some 
66 In Malawi, the Southern Region is the most developed of the three regions and contains 
more than half the population. New investment in the Northern and Central Regions and the 
movement of the state's capital from Zomba to Lilongwe in the early 1970s have made some 
progress towards addressing these regional imbalances (Africa South of the Sahara, 1999: 670). 
In South Africa, the most important region in the country's economy is Gauteng as the 
commercial, industrial and miIfing core of the economy, contributing around 37 percent of the 
country's GDP (EID, 1999: 22). 
67 Another exception to this rule was South Africa with its racially based regime, where the 
practice of 'democracy' was limit~d to the white minori!y. 
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SADC member states the majority of the ruling party and the weakness of the 
parliamentary opposition are more overwhelming than in others. Even the longest 
existing democracy in Southern Africa - Botswana - has this 'problem', because 
the ruling party (the Botswana Democratic Party - BDP) has managed to win the 
vast majority of parliamentary seats in every election since independence. 
In addition, elections are used more to justify the ruling party's 
predominance than to ensure the participation of the population in a particular 
country. In countries where the ruling party majority in parliament is sufficient to 
change the constitution, good reasons can easily be found to justify such changes, 
as the events in Namibia and Zambia68 have shown (Africa News Online, 
16.2.2000). 
Since many political parties tend to be ethnically based or supported by a 
particular ethnic group, the exclusion of ethnic groups from the government has 
further implications for the 'fragile' democracies in the SADC region. In ethnically 
divided societies, the election process is frequently accompanied by violence 
between supporters of different parties (see section 5.4.). 
Finally, severe economic situation in the 1980s in several SADC member 
\ 
states resulted in mass protests, which were subsequently politicised. Protrsters 
began linking their economIC ~Ievances to official corruption and 
mismanagement. Facing mass opposition, the SADC rulers introduced reforms 
leading to political liberalisation and democratisation. However, as asserted by 
Bratton and Van de Walle (1997: 107), increased political participation did not 
68 The new Zambian constitution, adopted in May 1996, prevented the former Zambian 
president Kaunda from contesting the presidential election. The new constitutional provisions 
banned any president from a third term in office, and any candidate whose parents were not both 
of Zambian origin (Kaunda's parents were from Malawi) from participating in the presidential 
_election. Similarly, with support from SW APO members, the national assembly of Namibia 
amended the constitution in order to allow Nujoma to seek a third presidential term (Africa South 
of the Sahara, 1999: 778, 1163).-
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result in a change of political culture or in the rules of the political game, as can be 
seen in the political situations in Zambia, Zimbabwe, Malawi, Lesotho and 
Angola. 69 
We can conclude that in at least the majority of SADC members the 
background conditions favourable to disintegration are forestalling the integration 
process of those states. Some member states such as South Africa, Botswana, 
Mauritius, and Seychelles are closer to becoming integrated, i.e. amalgamated 
security communities, than others, but even in these countries statesmen have to 
deal with economic, social and environmental problems, which are putting 
considerable burdens on their governments. These include poverty, debt burdens, 
aid dependency, unemployment, dependency on one or two commodity exports, 
the HIV / AIDS pandemic, resource scarcity and depletion, and underdevelopment 
in general. 
In some states, underdevelopment has become more a preoccupation of 
numerous governmental and non-governmental international organisations than a 
responsibility of their governments. The SADC governments have to give in to 
such management if they do not want to be cut off from loans and grants. 
\ 
Economic, social and other burdens are not only weakening state strucj:ures 
and the ability to engage in efficient state-making and nation-building, they are 
also endangering the security of ordinary citizens. SADC member states are 
therefore failing to achieve the goal of integration at state level and this is 
obstructing the integration process at regional level. 
69 These countries are characterised by political instability of civil war. Their leaders are 
being accused of autocratic practices, corruption and serving their self-interests. Similar practices 
have been observed in the past,~although the situation has somewhat improved. 
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6.2. The Challenge of the Formation of a Pluralistic Security 
Community in the SADC Region 
Since the beginning of the twentieth century there have been 'integrating 
efforts' underway in Southern Africa. They were a consequence of the economic 
dependence of South Africa's neighbouring states on South Africa, which resulted 
in the establishment of the Southern African Customs Union (SACU) and the 
Rand Monetary Area (RMA), now the Common Monetary Area (CMA). 
They were also a result of the anti-apartheid stance of South Africa's 
neighbours, since South Africa was posing a threat and causing instability in the 
Southern African region. This common anti-South African position resulted in 
informal arrangements among the Front Line States (FLS) 70 and in the 
institutionalisation within the framework of the Southern African Development 
Co-ordination Conference (SADCC), and later the Southern African Development 
Community (SADC). However, because of domestic changes the latter 
organisation welcomed the post-apartheid and democratic South Africa as a new 
member state and this act indicated a change in inter-state relations in the Southern 
African region. 
Although the SACU and CMA arrangements can be described as 'working', 
the development, political and security objectives stated in the SADC founding 
treaty, whose fulfilment could eventually lead to the establishment of a security 
community between SADC member states, are far from being realised. There are 
several economic, political and other obstacles at the regional level preventing the 
establishment of a pluralistic security community in the SADC region, and some 
of them are examined in this section. 
70 The FLS did not have any basic legal instruments and thus no formal status in international 
law (Cilliers, 1999: 84). 
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6.2.1. A Historical Overview of the Attempts at Regional Integration 
In 1910, the agreement establishing the South African-dominated SACU 
between South Africa, Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland7! started the integration 
process in Southern Africa. Its purpose was to expand trade in the area of the 
union.72 In 1969, SACU was renegotiated and South Africa conceded more 
advantageous conditions to its partners, but this was not sufficient to attract new 
members (Zacarias, 1999: 162-163).73 
As was the case with the formation of SACU, the sIgmng of the 1974 
agreement establishing the RMA74 between South Africa, Lesotho and Swaziland 
rested only on common economic interests. Furthermore, both arrangements were 
based on South Africa's domination over the weaker neighbouring economies75 
and not on common values, common rules, ~or predictability of behaviour. On the 
contrary, Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland supported the opposition to apartheid 
and subsequently South Africa raided their territories in search of its opponents. 
71 Namibia was formally a member of SACU by virtue of being 'administered' by South 
Africa since 1915, and joined the union after its independence in 1990 because of its dependence 
on South African economy. 
72 SACU provides for free movement of goods and services among membe~ states and the 
application ofa common external tariff to non-members (Leistner, 1997: 115). ! 
73 The renegotiations of the scheme whereby South Africa gets access to the markets of other 
SACU member states for its internationally uncompetitive goods in return for a disproportionate 
share of the revenue pool going to Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia and Swaziland started in 1994, 
because all SACU members had been dissatisfied with the functioning and performance of the 
scheme since 1980s (Gibb, 1998: 299). The renegotiations of the SACU agreement are currently 
at an advanced stage and are expected to be concluded in 2001 (Allafrica.com, 15.3.2001). 
74 The RMA provided for free capital flow and implementation of common exchange controls 
in the area (Leistner, 1997: 117). In 1986, the RMA was superseded by a new agreement, 
establishing the Tripartite Monetary Area, now the CMA (Africa South of the Sahara, 1999: 616), 
which Namibia formally joined in 1992. 
75 This domination is rooted in the history of the Southern African region. During the colonial 
era, the development of capitalism produced a high level of structural integration between South 
Africa and the region. However: the core areas of capital accumulation were focused on South 
~frica while other colonies functioned as peripheries and service economies. Consequently; there 
were inequalities in development within the regIOn (Gibb, 1998: 290), which have been 
perpetuated up to the present. 
79 
Still, both arrangements worked because South Africa was seeking a legitimisation 
of its internal policies, and the rest of the member states saw a possibility of 
extracting benefits from co-operation with the dynamic regional economy 
(Zacarias, 1999: 163-164). However, the RMA and SACU stayed limited to South 
Africa, Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia and Swaziland and were not broadened to 
include other Southern African states. 
During the 1980s, the apartheid regime in Pretoria tried to mobilise a support 
for the Constellation of Southern African States (CONSAS), an organisation that 
was to be anti-Marxist and devoted to the principles of free enterprise and 
regulation of economy by market mechanisms. The aim of this endeavour was to 
increase regional economic interdependence and lessen the threat of international 
sanctions, while at the same time secure the markets for South Africa's 
manufactured products (Gibb, 1998: 292). 
However, in 1980, the incompatibility of political, social and ideological 
values between South Africa and other Southern African states resulted in the 
signing of the Lusaka Declaration by nine states (Angola, Botswana, Lesotho, 
Malawi, Mozambique, Swaziland, Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe),76 which 
\ 
formally established the SADCC as a counter-constellation to CONSA~. Its 
objectives were: 
• the reduction of economic dependence, particularly on the Republic of South 
Africa; 
• the forging of links to create a genuine and equitable integration; 
• the mobilisation of resources to promote national, interstate and regional 
policies; and 
• a concerted action to secure international co-operation within the framework 
of the strategy for-economic liberation (Leistner, 1997: 118). 
76 Namibia joined in 1990. _ 
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The SADCC gained a reputation as a 'success' (Gibb, 1998: 302) perhaps 
because its objectives were not as ambitious as the objectives of other African 
regional organisations, which aimed at different forms of regional economic 
integration. However, the member states failed to reduce economic dependence on 
South Africa, and their dependence even increased over the years (Cilliers, 1996: 
18). 
This circumstance and the end of apartheid, which removed the principal 
motive for and source of unity among SADCC member states, resulted in the 
formation of the SADC in 1992 (Gibb, 1998: 302). The former SADCC member 
states became members of the new organisation, South Africa joined in 1994, 
Mauritius the next year, and the DRC and Seychelles in 1997. 
The SADC wants, according to the founding treaty, to achieve a general 
objective of development and economic growth through regional integration. More 
specifically, Article 5 of the Treaty of Windhoek (1992) sets out the following 
principles and objectives: 
• to achieve development and economic growth, alleviate poverty, enhance the 
standard and quality of life of the peoples of Southern Africa and support the 
\ 
socially disadvantaged through regional integration; 
• to evolve common political values, systems and institutions; 
• to promote and defend peace and security; 
• to promote self-sustaining development on the basis of collective self-reliance, 
and the interdependence of member states; 
• to achieve complementarity between national and regional strategies and 
programmes; 
• to promote and maximise productive employment and utilisation of resources 
of the region; 
• to achieve sustainable utilisation of natural resources and effective protection 
of the environment; .. and 
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• to strengthen and consolidate the long-standing historical, social and cultural 
affinities and links among the peoples of the region. 
Although the SADC strives to achieve a few non-economic objectives, 
these have to be viewed mainly as supporting the main objectives of development 
and economic integration. The extent to which such integration is conducive to the 
building of a security community is questionable but, as argued by liberal scholars, 
the countries engaging in high levels of trade are less likely to fight one another. 
Therefore, the increased levels of regional trade and other attendant transactions 
can have a positive impact on eventual political integration. However, there is 
general consensus that the processes of regional economic integration on the 
African continent have been unsuccessful so far, and are likely to be so in the 
future because of several economic and political conditions, which also obstruct 
the economic integration process of SADC member states. 
Economic obstacles to the integration process of African states, as seen by 
different scholars, can be summarised as follows: 
• models of the integration process are based on the European example, but the 
assumptions underlying that model are not relevant in the African context 
(Leistner, 1997: 120; Van Rooyen, 1998: 128); \ 
.I 
• the trade between African countries is far too limited77 because the economies 
are not complementary, but rather competitive (Cilliers, 1996: 13; Gibb, 1998: 
303; Leistner, 1997: 120); 
• the manufacturing sector is very small in most African countries (South 
Africa, Zimbabwe and Mauritius are said to be the exceptions in the SADC 
region) and dominated by multinational corporations, and countries are 
dependent on the export of one or two primary commodities (i.e. there is a 
77 For data on the intra-SADC trade, see Conclusion. 
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lack of diversification of produced and exported goods) (Leistner, 1997: 120; 
Van Rooyen, 1998: 126); 
• import duties represent a significant contribution to government revenues and 
the removal of barriers to trade would mean a decrease in budget resources; 
• the universal shortage of foreign exchange is an obstacle to increased intra-
African trade because countries generally demand payment III an 
internationally accepted currency (Leistner, 1997: 120-121); 
• there are major divergences among countries in respect of per capita income, 
industrialisation, and resource endowment, and the liberalisation of trade can 
contribute to even greater differences in regional development and to de-
industrialisation in some countries (Gibb, 1998: 304, 306; Leistner, 1997: 121; 
Van Rooyen, 1998: 126); and 
• heavy external indebtedness of most African countries, an infrastructure 
oriented towards serving the trade with Europe, falling per capita income, 
dependence on external aid,78 and the absence of societal groups with vested 
interests in promoting the regional integration process further contribute to the 
failure of the process of economic integration (Leistner, 1997: 121, Van 
Rooyen, 1998: 129). 
\ 
Moreover, Schweickert (1996: 52) claims that the integration process 
! 
among African states is hardly a viable option, because its net gains are too low 
for it to pass the hurdles erected by political, social and cultural factors. These 
political, social and cultural obstacles include: 
• artificial political boundaries; 
78 According to the Afric,tInstitute (CiUiers, 1996: 18), SADC projects depend on donor 
_finance for 90 percent of total costs. Moreover, donors complain that completed projects are not 
properly maintained, especially since SADC member states have troubles meeting the running 
costs of the projects (Leistner, 19-97: 119). 
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• different languages, legal and administrative systems, and cultural patterns, 
which are part of the colonial heritage, and help perpetuate close ties with 
former colonial powers (Leistner, 1997: 121); 
• ideological differences and cleavages between leaders which cannot be 
overcome by shared economic aims, especially because the benefits of 
regional integration are too long-term to make them politically popular (Haas, 
1973: 111; Van Rooyen, 1998: 130); 
• premature politicisation of actor expectations, thus preventing incremental 
bargaining on relatively non-controversial shared objectives (Haas, 1973: 
111 ); 
• the lack of internal integration of African countries, which makes them poor 
partners in a regional integration process because leaders are preoccupied with 
nation-building and maintaining andc·strengthening the control at home (Haas, 
1973: 111; Van Rooyen, 1998: 129); 
• narrow national/personal interests of governments and leaders, which are put 
above the regional ones (Leistner, 1997: 121); 
• bargaining with reciprocal benefits, especially where payoffs have to be 
deferred, is difficult because of the limits on resources; 
• the lack of a deep and wide popular base for co-operation (Ma~oni, 1994: 14, 
" 17); and 
• the difficulty of forming voluntary groups on a regional basis in the absence of 
pluralism (Haas, 1973: 111; Van Rooyen, 1998: 129). 
Despite these political and economic obstacles, there IS one· positive 
outcome noted by several scholars, which resulted from the SADC integration 
process: the forging of a regional identity and a sense of common destiny among 
the countries and peoples of Southern Africa (Cilliers, 1996: 18; Makoni, 1994: 
14). Van Nieuwkerk (199~ 29) opposes this view by claiming that the main actors 
- in the SADC "drama" are states and the political elites in control of these states. 
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Leistner (1997: 119) agrees with this position by arguing that up to now, the 
SADC has been essentially a club of governments, of which the vast majority of 
their peoples are barely aware. He goes on stating that cultural and social barriers 
which exist between most of the member states are consolidated by suspicion, fear 
and hatred of neighbours. These and other 'barriers' that are preventing the 
establishment of a pluralistic community in the SADC region are discussed in the 
next section. 
6.2.2. The Negative Impact of Regional Dynamics on the Formation of a 
Pluralistic Security Community 
In addition to disintegrative forces ~ithin SADC member states there are 
other factors operating at the regional level, which prevent the development of a 
pluralistic security community in the SADC region. Firstly" it is difficult to 
establish what Southern Africa encompasses as a region geographically and 
politically. This difficulty arises partly because of the allegiances of some 
countries to several regional groupings with similar objectives, and p\artly because 
Southern Africa lacks social, political and economic homogeneity. SADC 
members have not only failed to produce a sense of nationalism, as argued above, 
but also a sense of regionalism. As stated by Solomon and Cilliers (1996), 
Southern Africa is characterised by a multitude of narrow ethnic sub-nationalisms. 
Secondly, economic asymmetries can further obstruct the development of a 
pluralistic security community in the SADC region. The Community's stated 
objective is the so-called development integration/9 but in practice its member 
79 The basic assumption of development integration is that industrialisation and 
diversification of export commodities must be advanced before market integration can be 
considered. Development integration involves a C multi-sector programme in production, 
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states are primarily engaged in market integration (negative integration) 80 (Malan, 
1998: 4). The latter is known to strengthen or even increase the differences 
between member states of a regional organisation, which can lead to political 
tensions if not addressed properly. It is believed that the liberalisation of trade 
within the SADC region81 will have little impact on SACU member states, where 
trade has been carried on in similar terms for decades. Mauritius is also expected 
to have few problems in implementing the free trade agreement, but other states 
will find it much harder to implement the agreement, particularly Zimbabwe, 
which is the second largest regional trader after South Africa (EIU, 2000c: 25). 
Thirdly, political tensions can also arise on account of the differences in 
political values, because the SADC region comprises diverse political regimes. 
~. 
These vary from relatively democratic systems (such as Botswana, Mauritius, and 
South Africa) and semi-democratic regimes with authoritarian tendencies 
(Lesotho, Namibia, Zimbabwe, and Zambia) to monarchica! political systems 
(Swaziland) and countries entrenched in civil wars (Angola and the DRC). Such 
differences in political values make the mutual predictability of behaviour more 
difficult, especially since the behaviour of states is often based less\ on consistent 
foreign policy, and more on the arbitrary and erratic personal policy o~ some 
regional leaders. 
Fourthly, this situation makes questionable the willingness of governments 
to respond to one another's messages, needs and actions adequately and in time. 
infrastructure and trade. Conscious state intervention is necessary to promote co-operation and 
interdependence, while equal distribution of the benefits of such integration is needed. This 
integration is more political in nature than market integration, for example (Van Rooyen, 1998: 
129). 
80 The market integratio:rr-approach is based on the regional economic integration experience 
of industrialised states. It includes the lowering and the removal <:>f tariffs and other trad~ barriers 
between states in a region in order to increase trade between them (Van Rooyen, 1998: 128). 
81 The SADC officially launched the free trade agreement, which does not cover Angola, the 
DRC and Seychelles, on September 1, 2000 (EIU, 2000c: 24). 
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Furthermore, the vulnerability of SADC member states to transnational threats due 
to their weakness can result in tensions between them. For instance, Angola has 
accused Zambia of covert support given to the UNIT A by prominent members of 
the MMD. This support seems to have weakened as a result of the organised 
bombing campaign by Angola in Lusaka in the early 1999. During 2000, however, 
repeated cross-border raids by UNIT A and Angolan government troops have 
created more tensions, with Zambia protesting the incursions and Angola denying 
them (EIU, 2000b: 11). 
Finally, since the national interests of SADC member states dominate over 
collective or regional ones, the regional institutions are weak and display 
characteristics of an inter-governmental body as opposed to a supranational one 
-. 
(Solomon and Cilliers, 1996). The weakness of these institutions, which is further 
increased by the lack of common political values, has contributed to the fact that 
major security crises in the region were not dealt with within th~ framework of the 
SADC. Instead, the actions addressing these crises were undertaken outside the 
SADC structures (interventions in Lesotho by Botswana and South Africa and in 
the DRC by Namibia, Angola and Zimbabwe). In the next section, t~e institutions 
within the framework of SADC designed to manage and prevent region~l and 
transnational threats are examined. 
6.2.3. The Management of Regional and Transnational Threats to Security 
Some threats to security mentioned in the previous sections, such as arms 
smuggling, trans-border crime, illegal immigration, the spill-over of domestic 
conflicts into neighbouring states, refugees, and economic asymmetries between 
states, are regional or better yet transnational in natut:e. These issues combined 
with domestic concerns of SADC members (poverty, water supply, environmental 
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degradation and HIV / AIDS, for example) can lead, according to Ohlson 
(Adekanye et at., 1999: 52), to severe conflicts between Southern African states if 
not handled appropriately and in time. Hence, the management of different 
transnational and regional security threats at the regional level is necessary for the 
eventual elimination of a regional security complex. Yet that can prove to bea 
problem for the SADC region. 
According to Buzan's definition of a security complex, the integration 
process within and between SADC member states could eventually lead to a 
security community provided that these states constitute a (sub )regional security 
complex. However, it is probably safe to argue that the SADC region cannot 
constitute a security complex by itself. Security issues from neighbouring states 
spill over into the SADC region and v{ce versa. For example, the security 
problematic of virtually all DRC's neighbouring states, including SADC non-
member states, is essentially linked to the security problematic of the DRC. 
The events in the DRC indicate that regional security must increasingly 
encompass the SADC's immediate neighbourhood if the spill-over of instability 
and conflict into the region is to be avoided. Furthermore, regional security can 
\ 
only be assured by continental security throughout Africa (Selebi, 1999: 6). ,Thus, 
it would be difficult to establish first, a workable security regime and later, a 
security community in the SADC region without linking such a regime to a wider 
security arrangement. This does not mean that the management or removal of 
threats in the SADC region is to be avoided at the expense of a broader 
arrangement, rather that the porous borders of the SADC cannot guarantee the 
development of a security community among its members without the 
establishment of security __ communities in countries bordering the SADC region, 
_ since the spill-over of insecurities from the neighbouring states can threaten the 
security of SADC member_states. 
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Although the SADC focuses on development integration, its member states 
have designed, as a result of threats to security in the region, a mechanism for the 
management of mostly political and military threats to security. In 1996, the Organ 
for Politics, Defence and Security (OPDS) was founded with plans to 
institutionalise the new security thinking in its organisational structure. However, 
by the second half of 1997, the OPDS was suspended because of "structural 
problems" (Breytenbach, 2000: 85).82 These structural problems have been 
resolved only recently at the extraordinary summit of SADC leaders in March 
2001, where it was decided that the Head of the OPDS would report to the SADC 
Chairman. The OPDS will be part of the SADC structures and co-ordinated on a 
troika basis. Leadership will be rotational for a period of one year (Allafrica.com, 
12.3.2001). 
It can be argued that political and security co-operation in Southern Africa 
dates back to the early 1970s when Tanzania and Zambia formed a grouping 
known as the Front Line States (FLS) (Malan, 1998: 12).83 The FLS was an 
informal forum for the discussion of mainly political and, to a lesser extent, 
military problems common among liberation movements, and the problems faced 
1 
by newly independent governments (Cilliers, 1999: 4). The most importanl task, 
however, was to lobby for the liberation of Namibia, South Africa and Zimbabwe 
from white minority rule. Other states in the region joined later (Mozambique in 
1975, Angola in 1976, Zimbabwe in 1980, Namibia in 1990 and South Africa in 
82 These included the uncertainty about the position of the chair of the OPDS relative to the 
chair of the SADC, the functional autonomy or dependence of the OPDS, and the operational 
procedures when conflict resolution would be on the agenda (Breytenbach, 2000: 85-86). 
83 On account of the infonnal character of the FLS, it is difficult to establish when the FLS 
was formed. Cilliers (1999: 5) puts the beginning of the FLS in 1975 with Botswana, 
- Mozambique, Tanzania and Zambia as founders. Venter (199-6: 173) claims that the FLS 
grouping was formed in 1974, and Cilliers (1996: 25) that it was established in 1970 by Tanzania 
and Zambia. 
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1994), and on July 30, 1994 the organisation was dissolved to become the political 
and security wing of the SADC, since the elimination of white minority rule in the 
region removed the raison d'etre of the FLS. 
Security issues of the FLS were discussed in the Inter-State Defence and 
Security Committee (ISDSC), also an informal substructure of the FLS (Cilliers, 
1999: 4). The ISDSC was established in 1983 with initially seven member states 
(Malan, 1998: 40)84 and since it was not disbanded as the FLS was, its 
membership reflects the membership of the SADC. The ISDSC has three 
subcommittees dealing with defence, public security and state security with no 
permanent secretariat (Cilliers, 1999: 37_38),85 but it is planned that the ISDSC 
will be an institution of the OPDS (Breytenbach, 2000: 86). 
The history of the OPDS dates back to 1995 when SADC foreign ministers 
decided to create the Association of Southern African States (ASAS), which 
would provide a mechanism to deal with conflict prevention! management and 
resolution in Southern Africa. However, in June 1996, the SADC Heads of State 
accepted the formation of the OPDS instead with 16 political, defence and security 
objectives to be pursued by the new institution (Malan, 1998: P_14).86 The 
84 Another source (Cilliers, 1999: 88) notes that the first meeting of the ISDSC occurred in 
1975 and was attended by Mozambique, Tanzania and Zambia. 
85 The ISDSC's role is to provide a forum for: 
• reviewing and sharing the experiences, exploring areas of co-operation and exchanging 
views in the field of defence; 
• co-ordinating activities, exchanging experiences and information, and exploring the areas 
and means of enhancing co-operation in the field of public security; 
• reviewing the security situations and issues related to security, recommending appropriate 
measures to deal with potential threats to the stability in the SADC region and member 
states, and considering. ways of consolidating and expanding co-operation in the field of 
state security (Cilliers, 1999: 38). 
86 The OPDS role is to: 
• protect the people and safeguard the development of the region, against instability arising 
from the breakdown ~of1aw and order, interstate conflict and external aggression; 
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objectives can be roughly grouped into those dealing with: military issues, 
peacemaking, peacekeeping and peace enforcement, conflict prevention, 
management and resolution, crime prevention, intelligence, foreign policy, and 
human rights (Cilliers, 1999: 26). 
• promote political co-operation among member states and the evolution of common 
political value systems and institutions; 
• develop a common foreign policy in areas of mutual concern and interest, and to lobby as 
a region on issues of common interest at international forums; 
• co-operate in regional security and defence through conflict prevention, management and 
resolution; 
• mediate in interstate and intrastate disputes and conflicts; 
• use preventive diplomacy to pre-empt conflict in the region through an early warning 
system; 
• where conflict occurs, to seek to end it as quickly as possible through diplomatic means. 
Where such means fail, the OPDS would recommend that the Summit should consider 
punitive measures. These responses would be agreed upon in a Protocol on Peace, 
Security and Conflict Resolution; 
• promote and enhance the development of democratic institutions and practices within 
member states, and encourage the observance of universal human rights as provided for 
in the charters and conventions of the OAU and the UN; \ 
• promote peacemaking and peacekeeping in order to achieve sustainable pea~e and 
security; 
• give political support to the organs and institutions of the SADC; 
• promote political, economic, social and environmental dimensions of security; 
• develop a collective security capacity and conclude a Mutual Defence Pact for 
responding to external threats, and a regional peacekeeping capacity within national 
armies that could be called upon within the region or the continent; 
• develop close co-operation between the police and security services of the region, with a 
view to addressing cross-border crime, as well as promoting a community-based 
approach on matters of security; 
• encourage and monitor the ratification of the UN, the OAU and other international 
conventions and treaties on arms control and disarmament, human rights and peaceful 
relations between states; 
• co-ordinate the participation of member states in internaticmal and regional peacekeeping 
operations; and 
• address extra-regional conflicts which impact on peace and security in Southern Africa 
(Malan, 1998: 40-41). -
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However, the co-ordination of policies and the management of security 
issues in the SADC region is problematic because of several circumstances noted 
by various scholars: 
• as a weak institution, the SADC often responds to rather than initiates actions 
on security-related developments; 
• the SADC secretariat seems reluctant to engage in issues that could divert its 
focus from economic and development matters (Cilliers, 1999:12,81);87 
• the OPDS is meant to promote economic, political, environmental and social 
dimensions of security, but there is no connection or formal interaction 
between the socio-economic sectors of the SADC and OPDS at present 
(Breytenbach, 2000: 88); 
• an attempt to institutionalise civil S,.ociety participation in the SADC or the 
OPDS processes has not been made yet, and there is the absence of integrated 
systems, processes and methods to deal with the issues of human rights and 
the advancement of democracy and good governance (Breytenbach, 2000: 88; 
Cilliers, 1999: 45, 76). This is quite understandable since the advancement of 
these 'controversial' values can erode the security of some regimes in power; 
and 
• the ISDSC, in tum, has neither the mandate nor the structure till deal 
appropriately with conflict prevention, management and resolution (Malan, 
1998: 17).88 
87 In spite of this, donor pressure has already resulted in protocols and initiatives regarding 
small arms, landmines and drugs (Cilliers, 1999: 12). 
88 The reality is that most SADC member states have small armed forces that are ill-equipped, 
poorly trained by international peacekeeping standards, poorly led, and with a strong emphasis on 
internal security concerns. T.fierefore, sub-regional peacekeeping and intervention would be 
dependent upon the dominance of a single regional power, such ~s South Africa, as opposed to 
- the combined efforts of a number of states. Furthermore, capacity-building for peacekeeping is 
largely dependent on donor countries seeking to capacitate weak and unconsolidated states to 
provide security in a region (Cilliers, 1999: 52-53). 
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Once the OPDS starts functioning, other problems can anse due to the 
sensitivity of SADC leaders to the interference in the internal affairs of their states. 
Furthennore, one can be sceptical about the loyalty of some states to SADC 
arrangements, since they are also members of COMESA. Zimbabwe as the 
dominant member of COMESA has tended to show more devotion to this 
organisation than other states in the region. Such conflicting membership can lead 
to stalemates, unnecessary competition (institutional rivalry)89 and the 
misapplication of the scarce regional resources (Zacarias, 1999: 116).90 
It can be concluded that the presence of conditions conducive to 
disintegration within the SADC member states, the absence of conditions 
favourable to integration at the regional level, and the inability of SADC 
institutions to deal with regional and other threats to security, strongly work 
against the establishment of a pluralistic security community within the SADC 
regIon. 
89 For instance, COMESA member states are also committed to the promotion of peace, 
security and stability as prerequisites for achieving sustainable development. The member states 
have realised that the conflicts within the region have a negative impact on COMESA's 
integration agenda, since some of the member states have not been able to join the Free Trade 
Area, which started functioning on November 1, 2000, due to the prevalence of conflicts 
(COMESA Web Page; Allafrisa.com, 1004.2001). 
90 The lack of resources makes it more difficult for states to_support regional organisations 
- financially. For instance, by July 2000, SADC member states owed the organisation more than 
6.8 million US dollars, while the DRC has never paid its dues to the Community ever since it 
joined in 1997 (Allafrica.com, f4.2.2001). 
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7. CONCLUSION 
The Cold War has in many ways inserted rigidity into the thinking of 
political leaders as well as theoreticians. The predominance of ideological, 
economic and military rivalry between the two superpowers induced scholars to 
view international relations largely in the context of this rivalry. Consequently, 
security studies as part of international relations theory concerned themselves with 
the security of states in the Cold War environment and were mainly a domain of 
Western scholars. 
After the Cold War, the releasing of tensions III international politics 
brought new economic and political issues to the surface, such as trade 
liberalisation, economic development, democratisation and human rights, to name 
just a few. Moreover, the security preoccupations of the US and the Soviet Union 
prevented the international community from putting issues' such as poverty, 
famine, illiteracy, political oppression, resource scarcity and environmental 
degradation at the top of its agenda, even though they were a dominant concern of 
the majority of the world's population. 
I 
As a result, the international and academic community increasingly 'started 
taking into consideration non-military threats to the survival of people, and the 
new security thinking developed. It is being recognised that in many parts of the 
world, particularly in Africa, states cannot be seen as the main or only referent 
objects of security. Furthermore, the state was, and still is, a source of threats to 
the citizens. This occurs when a regime in power uses oppression or engages in 
civil war to stay in power; and also when a regime manages the state for the 
enrichment of its members on the one hand and mismanages the economy, health 
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and social services on the other, which results in increased levels of poverty, 
famine, disease, unemployment, and so on. 
The tension between state/regime and human security has induced some 
scholars to consider people as the main referent object of security, and to put 
human security at the centre of security preoccupations. This people-centric 
approach seems to be increasingly recognised by the international community and 
the UN with its agencies in particular, by placing people at the centre of its 
development and security endeavours. 
With the end of the Cold War, hopes were placed on the international 
community to play a greater role in addressing the security concerns of African 
people in the absence of legitimate, responsible and efficient states. This raises the 
question as to how relevant the African state is for the security and wellbeing of 
the African people. 
Since the approach of the international community to Africa's most acute 
security problems, related to the political instability and civil wars, is 'African 
solutions to African problems', and since the state is still considered the only 
legitimate institution to ensure security of the people, and "the g~rdian of the 
common good" (Zacarias, 1999: 153) at the same time, the African state ~as to 
persist. However, where the legitimacy of the state as a provider of security is 
disputable, as is the case in many African states, this is largely due to the 
unfinished processes of state-making and nation-building, and is further 
undermined by underdevelopment of these countries. 
The fact that SADC members are still struggling to become 
integrated/cohesive and strong states, and that conditions conducive to 
disintegration as put forward by Deutsch and his colleagues are preventing them 
- from becoming integrated communities, makes the building of a pluralistic 
security community within SADC region < rather difficult.· Differing political 
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values, mistrust, personal rivalry and fear between SADC member states as well as 
regionalisation of new security threats indicate that the SADC is a "community of 
fate" (Booth, 1994: 16) rather than a security community. 
However, some developments can be observed at both the state and 
regional levels that could provide a basis for regional integration efforts. The end 
of apartheid removed a source of tensions and insecurities in the region and an 
obstacle to building a security community in South Africa and Southern Africa, at 
the same time. Moreover, the gradualliberalisation of the political systems in the 
SADC region provides an opportunity for the development of common values of 
the SADC member states. 
But if the process of political liberalisation is not accompanied by state-
making and nation-building it can result in the escalation of political tensions and 
insecurity. Although democratic regimes tend to keep their international peace, 
only strong states can keep their domestic peace (Kacowicz, 1997: 385). The 
adoption of Western models of democracy by a weak state can lead to political 
instability when excluded groups challenge the winning group and consequently 
increase the threats to the security of a regime as well as the populati~n at large. In 
addition, political pluralism can exacerbate possible ethnic and separatist riv,ttlries, 
with irredentist claims that spill over state borders (Kacowicz, 1997: 376). 
Therefore, contrary to the policies of the international community, 
democracy is far more likely to succeed as a mechanism for introducing 
accountability into a strong state than as a means of preserving a weak one 
(Clapham, 1993: 434). Furthermore, national unity has to precede any process of 
democratisation (Rustow, 1970). Thus, the path to increased levels of human 
security necessarily lead~_ through the establishment of a strong state with loyal 
_ citizens. 
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Bearing in mind the functioning of African societies and the previously 
mentioned disintegrative tendencies stemming from the uncritical adoption of 
Western models of democracy, we can agree with Bayart (Riley, 1992: 549) who 
sees Africa's potential for democracy more in the creation of small collectives 
established and controlled by rural or urban groups, such as local associations, 
than in parliaments and parties, and instruments of the state, of accumulation, and 
of alienation. Such decentralisation can also enhance the loyalty of citizens, since 
they are given a better opportunity to participate in the decision-making process. 
Still, the loyalty of various (regional, religious and ethnic) groups will not 
be assured as long as they do not take part in the division of the state's resources. 
Since these resources are scarce and, in most cases, insufficient or hardly 
sufficient to satisfy the needs of one group, the 'pie' from which pieces for 
different groups are cut needs to be enlarged through the process of development, 
conceived not only in economic but also in social and political terms. 
A second positive development is that SADC members seem to be 
committed to increasing the flow of transactions between them, particularly trade. 
In mid-1994, shortly before South Africa joined the SADC, about 4 percent of the 
ten SADC members' trade was within the Community, while 25 percent wa" with 
South Africa. When South Africa became a SADC member, the intra-Community 
trade increased and is now estimated at around 25 percent. This increase is largely 
due to South Africa's membership in the organisation, because the level of trade 
between other member states remains low (see Table 3 and Table 4). With the 
liberalisation of the intra-SADC trade the percentage of intra-Community trade is 
expected to rise to about 35 percent (BIU, 1999: 43; BIU, 2000a: 24). 
The extent to whi.£h the development of SADC member states could be 
_ strengthened by the trade liberalisation and economic -integration process at the 
regional level is debatable, but according to the 1995 World Bank analysis 
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(Solomon and Cilliers, 1996), which basically summarises conclusions made in 
the past by various scholars, the structure of African countries' exports and imports 
differs so widely that regional trade integration efforts hold little promise for 
accelerating industrialisation and growth. Thus, it is not surprising that South 
Africa's liberalisation of trade with the EU preceded the one with the SADC. It can 
be hoped, however, that in time the expected development and economic growth 
of South Africa will have spill-over effects in the Southern African region, thus 
increasing the prospects of the SADC for becoming a pluralistic security 
community through the regional integration process. 
TABLE 3: EXPORTS OF SADC AND SACU MEMBER STATES 
Organisation Intra- Intra-Organisation Exports of Exports of South 
Organisation Exports Excluding Members States to Africa to 
Exports* South Africa* South Africa* Member States* 
SADC 21.19 4.59 10.93 24.43 
SACU 25.47 0.28 26.93 17.14 
* all figures represent the percentage of world trade In 1996 
TABLE 4: IMPORTS OF SADC AND SACU MEMBER STATES 
Organisation Intra- Intra-Ot:ganisation Imports of Imports of South 
Organisation Imports excluding Members States Africa from 
Imports* South Africa* from South Africa* Member States* 
SADC 22.4 3.86 44.39 6.76 
SACU 21.81 0.16 89.36 5.45 
* all figures represent the percentage of world trade in 1996 
Data for Tables 3 and 4 was calculated on the basis of figures from SADe (2000) The Official 
SADC Trade, Industry and Investment Review 2000. Southern African Marketing Co. (Pty) Ltd. 
and SADC. 
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Although the percentage of intra-SADC trade is relatively low, some 
countries are more 'integrated' than others. As noted, during apartheid SACU 
provided easily accessible markets for South Africa's exports, and thus Botswana, 
Lesotho, Namibia, and Swaziland still import most of their goods from South 
Africa (see Table 4). Since this level of trade is not matched by a similar level of 
trade on South Africa's side, trade relations of SACU member states are 
characterised by their dependence on South Africa's exports, rather than 
interdependence. In the case of Swaziland and Lesotho, this dependence is even 
greater because they represent labour reserves for their economically dominant 
neighbour. 
This circumstance can have potentially disruptive effects on intra-SACU 
relations, but if the problem of dependency"is addressed properly, this small area 
within the SADC, possibly with some other neighbouring states (Mozambique, for 
instance), can provide the core area of the economic as well as political integration 
process, provided that problems of their national integration are addressed 
efficiently and in time. 
A third factor worth noting is that this approach of "variable geometry" or 
\ 
"variable speed" (Van Rooyen, 1998: 130) can be strengthened by improvin,g and 
building the transport infrastructure to, facilitate transactions within and between 
SADC member states. Many projects to build the so-called transport corridors are 
currently being planned or implemented, such as the Maputo corridor, the 
Lubombo corridor (both involving South Africa and Mozambique), the West 
Coast corridor, and the Wild Coast corridor (both in South Africa), to name some 
of them (EIU, 2000a: 21-22). 
The construction and renovation of transport infrastructure is in process in 
all Community states, largely with the support of donor countries and the World 
Bank. It is especially needed in countries where transport networks were destroyed 
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or made inoperative by civil war as in Angola and Mozambique (Africa South of 
the Sahara, 1999). 
A fourth important factor is that transnational insecurities are forcing 
SADC member states to co-operate on a bilateral or multilateral basis. The illegal 
immigration of economic and other refugees to South Africa is a good example of 
such a transnational issue where co-operation is necessary. As proven in the past, 
the South African government is unable to deal with the numbers of illegal 
immigrants entering the country every day (Solomon and Cilliers, 1996). It is clear 
that border controls or forceful repatriations will not solve the problem; this can be 
achieved mostly through long-term 'projects' of economic development, state-
making and nation-building, the implementation of which will remove the causes 
of emigration. Thus, South Africa should be interested in co-operating with the 
countries of emigration to implement these projects as soon as possible. 
The presence of transnational and regional threats to security requires that 
the efforts aimed at the establishment of amalgamated security communities are 
strengthened at least by the management of threats at the regional level, albeit not 
necessarily in the framework of the SADC. It seems that be~ause of the 
deficiencies of OPDS and SADC more 'modest' bilateral or multi4tteral 
arrangements might provide a better way for the formation of a regional security 
regime and produce more tangible results than comprehensive regional ones. 
Working and successful bilateral or multilateral agreements addressing a particular 
security issue or a cluster of issues can enhance the trust between countries or their 
leaders and encourage them to co-operate on the resolution or management of 
other security issues. The end-result of this step-by-step approach would be a 
security regime. 
Many successful operations have been undertaken with the co-operation of 
clusters of SADC member states to enhance the security in the region (for some 
.-- ... -
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examples see Cilliers, 1999). In addition, several bilateral and multilateral 
agreements relating to co-operation on various security issues91 have been 
concluded by SADC member states, and the signing of more agreements is in 
preparation.92 Co-operation regarding security can also be attempted at sub-
nationallevels.93 
In addition to all these positive changes, we cannot disregard the integrative 
potential of (latent or manifest) conflicts and tensions within as well as between 
states. Although conflicts tend to be detrimental to the development of a security 
community, any successful and peaceful resolution of conflicts can build mutual 
confidence and benefit community-building. 
All these developments are compelling the SADC to continue with its 
integration process, particularly at the regional level. However, most SADC 
members are poorly integrated weak states still facing the demanding tasks of 
state-making and nation-building, whose implementation could eventually lead to 
national integration (i.e. the establishment of an amalgamated security 
community). 
Here, the question arises as to whether the simultaneous establishment of a 
\ 
pluralistic security community is possible between SADC members on thf one 
hand, and an amalgamated security cOplmunity within the states on the other, or 
whether one has to precede the other. 
Deutsch's concept of a pluralistic security community implies that a 
pluralistic security community is composed of entities that have already become 
91 These agreements include measures related to mutual defence, weapon smuggling, drug 
smuggling, disaster relief, security training and assistance, trade on small arms, cross-border 
policing, and the like (Solomon and Cilliers, 1996). 
92 See for example Cilliers~1999: 68-74. 
93 Bilateral agreements dealing with transnational 'crime' have been signed at the provincial 
level between the Mpumalanga province in South Africa and the neighbouring provinces of 
Maputo and Gaza in Mozambiqtte (Solomon and Cilliers, 1996). 
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integrated. Therefore, communities that have not eliminated the preparations for, 
and expectations of conflict, among their members cannot achieve integration at 
the supranational level. This condition does not seem to be fulfilled by most 
SADC member states where inter-ethnic or communal violence and tensions, or 
even civil wars, indicate the absence of an integrated community. If we use the 
broader definition of a security community (see section 4.2.), the absence of such a 
community within the SADC member states is even more evident. 
Since most SADC members are incapable of assuring the security of their 
citizens by forming security communities within their borders (ensuring freedom 
from fear and freedom from want), this is also preventing the formation of a larger 
security community at the regional level. The emergence of a pluralistic security 
community in a region before the emergence of amalgamated security 
communities IS thus theoretically and practically inconceivable. If the SADC 
region is to become a pluralistic security community, national integration is 
necessary III order to remove or minimise internal insecurities.94 A pluralistic 
security community has to evolve on the basis of integrated national communities, 
but the concomitant development of pluralistic and amalgamated security 
\ 
communities is theoretically possible. 
It is difficult to imagine, thoug4, that the process of national integration is 
going to end in the short term, and since its successful completion is required for 
SADC member states to effectively engage in the formation of a pluralistic 
security community, the goal of the establishment of such a community in the 
SADC region is necessarily placed in the distant future. 
94 Here, the argument made by Claude (Taylor, 1993: 42) that the consolidation of the state 
in developing countries has fa precede the (functional) co-operation and integration becomes 
_ relevant. States need to be strengthened in order to be transcended. Thus, the weaklless of 
developing states can in part explain why they have problems engaging in the integration as well 
as the globalisation processeS".-
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The analysis in this thesis has addressed the complexity of the security 
problematic of the SADC region. In addition, this problematic is linked to the 
process of integration within as well as between SADC member states and the 
establishment of amalgamated and pluralistic security communities. 
The issues of new security threats and the establishment of a security 
community are being increasingly researched by African scholars and institutions. 
However, freedom from fear and freedom from want as the two main pillars of the 
new security thinking still need to be adopted by the majority of SADC 
governments as the guiding principles of economic, social, environmental, health 
and other policies. This can be considered as a first step to establishing 
amalgamated and pluralistic security communities, where the elimination or 
considerable reduction of 'old' and 'new' security threats will ensure quality of life 
for the people in the SADC region. 
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